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حزب مردم بلوچستان Balochistan People’s Party بلوچستانءِ اُستمانءِ گــَل |
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20-07-2007 ; BalochUnity YahooGroup
In respect of The whole world-community!!!! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22.09.2007 ; http://www.balochunity.org/
By Buthaina Al Balushia The west is obsessed with Tehran's nuclear programme, but doesn't give a damn about human rights abuses. By Peter Tatchell ; 23-09-2007 ; http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk The Islamic Republic of Iran has executed three more Arab political prisoners, just days after a visit from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour. In further defiance of the UN and international law, four more Arabs face imminent execution. There have been no protests from Britain, the EU or the UN. The UN's silence comes on top of the truly appalling vote by UN Human Rights Council to abandon its monitoring of human rights abuses in Iran. The only thing the west seems to care about is Iran's nuclear programme. Human rights abuses do not concern Washington, London or Brussels. Nor do they concern President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Both men have warmly embraced the tyrant of Tehran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Arab League, the supposed defender of Arab peoples worldwide, is equally indifferent. It has refused to protest to Iran about the persecution of ethnic Arabs in the south-west of the country - the oil-rich region Tehran calls Khuzestan, but which the indigenous Arab peoples call al-Ahwaz. While condemning Israel for abusing the Palestinian people, Arab states are silent about the abuse of fellow Arabs by the Iranian regime. The anti-imperialist left is also mute. Why the double standards? Palestinian Arabs get the support of progressives and radicals everywhere; Iranian Arabs get no support at all. They swing from nooses in public squares like cattle hanging in an abattoir. Does anyone care? Ahwazi Arabs accuse Tehran of Persian chauvinism, racism and ethnic cleansing, as I previously revealed in Tribune. The response to that article from some Islamists, left-wingers and anti-war activists was to denounce me as racist and anti-Muslim. But how can it be Islamophobic or racist to defend Arab Muslims against Tehran's persecution? Amnesty International has also expressed concern about the bloody repression and economic exploitation of Iran's Arab minority, as has Dr Karim Abdian of the Ahwaz Human Rights Organisation (AHRO). I recently interviewed Dr Abdian for my Talking With Tatchell TV programme, which you can watch here. The execution of three Arabs last week is the latest in a series of barbaric hangings, designed to terrorise the Arab population into submission. Ten other Arabs are known to have been executed since December last year. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned their trials as unjust and unfair. In January this year, three UN special rapporteurs also voiced concerns about the way the trials were conducted. Their concerns confirm criticisms by one of Iran's leading human rights advocates, Emad Baghi. In a letter to the chief of the judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, he argued that the trials of Ahwazi Arabs were flawed, the charges baseless, and that the sentencing was based on a spurious interpretation of law. The men hanged last week were Abdulreza Nawaseri, Mohammad Ali Sawari and Jafar Sawari. Charged with bombing the Zergan oilfields in 2005, they were executed secretly in prison using Tehran's sadistic slow strangulation method, deliberately designed to prolong the suffering of the victims. The men denied all the charges during a summary one-day trial in which they were deprived of adequate legal representation and denied the opportunity to call witnesses in their defence. Their lawyers were not allowed to meet them and were not given time to read their files. When they subsequently complained about the conduct of the trial, five of the seven lawyers (all Arabs) were arrested and summoned to court on allegations that they had threatened national security. Abdulreza Nawaseri, aged 32, was arrested in 2000 and sentenced to 35 years in prison. He was in jail at the time of the Zergan bombings and therefore could not have committed the attacks, which further suggests that these men were framed on false charges. Brothers Mohammad Ali Sawari and Jafar Sawari had been in prison since 2005. They were initially accused of promoting Sunni Islam, which is a heinous crime in the sectarian Shia state of Iran. These charges were later supplemented with charges of bombing the Zergan oilfields. No evidence was produced to back up the charges. Mohammad Ali, a 37-year-old teacher, was an English literature graduate. Some reports claim he was also accused of translating George Orwell's book, Animal Farm, into Arabic, with the aim of sparking an uprising. According to his family, there was no allegation of bombings in his file. The men's execution prompted spontaneous anti-government demonstrations in Ahwaz. Security forces fired on the crowds. Reports suggest that one person was killed and 20 others wounded. At least six more Arab political prisoners are facing imminent execution. Four of them are in Karoun prison. These prisoners include Hamzah Sawari, 20 years old, who is accused of giving unauthorised religious instruction in a local mosque, instigating worshippers against the state and displaying the Ahwazi flag in 2005. The other men scheduled to hang with him are Zamel Bawi, Abdulemam Zaeri and Nazem Boryhi. The charges against them have not been made public. Two more Arabs, who were illegally handed over to Tehran by Syria, are also expected to be hanged. The UN High Commission for Refugees reports that the men were recognised refugees and therefore protected under international and Syrian law from removal to a country such as Iran where they could be at risk of torture and execution. According to Daniel Brett, chair of the British Ahwazi Friendship Society:
Contrary to Tehran's propaganda, most Arab movements in al-Ahwaz are not violent separatists. They primarily want non-discrimination, cultural rights, social justice and regional self-government - not independence. If, however, Tehran continues to rebuff moderate, mainstream Arab opinion, there is a danger that many Arabs will turn to armed struggle and wage a full-scale national liberation war with the aim of outright independence. This would turn oil-rich al-Ahwaz into another zone of violent instability, with adverse global economic consequences as a result of diminished oil production and rising oil prices. Quite rightly, most Arabs do not support a US attack on Iran. Military intervention would strengthen the position of the hardliners in Tehran; allowing President Ahmadinejad to play the nationalist card and, using the pretext of defending the country against imperialism, to further crack down on dissent. Many Ahwazis believe the route to liberation is an internal "people power" alliance of Iranian socialists, liberals, democrats, students, trade unionists and minority nationalities. I have supported the Iranian people's struggle for democracy and human rights for four decades - first against the western-backed imperial fascist Shah and, since 1979, against the clerical fascism of the ayatollahs. Some anti-war leftists refuse to condemn the Tehran dictatorship and refuse to support the Iranian resistance; arguing that to do so would play into the hands of the US neocons and militarists. I disagree. Opposing imperialism and defending human rights are complementary, not contradictory. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Iran-Hamas Relations: The Growing Threat of a Radical Religious Coalition By Meyrav Wurmser, 19th September 2007 ; The Henry Jackson Society 2007 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: - The coup launched by Hamas against the Palestinian Authority in Gaza in May 2007 more than a year after the organization won the Palestinian elections, was a monumental event, not just for the Palestinians, but for the Middle East as a whole. - Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran, the proud sponsor of Hizballah who launched a successful war against Israel in Lebanon during the previous summer, was once again signaling, through the actions of its Palestinian client, that it has taken on the behavior of a regional hegemon. - Indeed, Iran’s rhetoric and actions in the past few years made clear that its leadership views itself as the leader of a bloc of Third World nations that actively oppose the West and wishes to harm its interests, in Iraq and elsewhere, in every way conceivable way. - One central aspect of Iran’s hegemonic ambitions is its growing alliance with Hamas. This relationship dates back to December 1990, when Hamas’ leaders were invited by the Iranian government for the first known time on an official visit for a conference on the Palestinian uprising.
- The ties between the two grow much closer
and more intimate, however, only after August 2005, when Iran held elections
bringing Ahmadinejad to power. In January 2006 Hamas was swept into power in
elections held in the Palestinian territories. Hamas’ Goals and Pan-Islamic Agenda Hamas is committed to basic principles from which it has not deviated even when it joined forces with the Palestinian Authority to form a joint short-lived, democratically elected government in 2006. The key principles of the Hamas government included:
Hamas is not simply a Palestinian liberation movement. It is more than anything else a pan-Islamic movement that like its mother organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, views itself as part of a global Islamist movement. Hamas traces its link to the Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al Banna and his son-in-law, the Egyptian Said Ramadan, who in the 1940s had direct authority over the activities of the Brotherhood activities in Palestine. This connection continues to this day. Hamas lacks an authoritative religious leadership; it continues to depend on non-Palestinian religious personalities residing abroad to issue rulings of Islamic law. One of them is Yusuf al Qaradawi, an Egyptian residing in Qatar. Qaradawi is the purveyor of the Islamic rulings permitting Hamas to carry out suicide bombings. Hamas’s pan-Islamic worldview extends beyond its contacts with other pan-Islamic movements. Hamas not only seeks money from the greater Muslim world for its operations, but also its covenant calls on Muslim countries surrounding Israel to “open their borders to Jihad fighters from among the Arab and Islamic people.” Although the organization has not been able to recruit foreign Islamic jihad fighters to its cause, Palestinian have played a considerable role in the global jihad. This was the case, for example, with Abdallah Azzam who taught in Saudi Arabia and was an associate of Osama bin Laden. In this and in other ways, Hamas is not simply a local Palestinian movement, but rather aspires to become a driver of radicalized Islam, despite the fact that even at present its activities are limited to Palestine. The organization draws from both the Palestinian struggle and the rising wave of Islamic radicalism globally. For this reason, it is not a bridge too far for Hamas to accept Iranian patronage, ideological guidance, and support. The Iran-Hamas Relationship: Looking for the Money Trail The relationship between Iran and Hamas went through three stages. In the first stage, in the late 1980s, the relations were marginal. During this period Iran’s attention was focused on rallying Shiite support in the Gulf, encouraging and sustaining international terror and building up Hizballah—its Shiite arm in Lebanon. During this period Hamas, a Sunni organization, had little to do with Iran, which showed clear sectarian preference for its Shiite clients. Hamas was also antagonized by Iran’s support for its Palestinian radical Islamist rival, Islamic Jihad, which Hamas viewed as a chief competitor for support in the Palestinian street. The second stage began with the invasion of Iraq in 1991. As a result of Iraq’s weakened standing following the first Gulf War, Iran started to view itself as a budding regional hegemon and a prospective leader of the Third World. Its ties to Hamas grew substantially stronger after October 1992, when a Hamas delegation led by Dr. Musa Abu Marzuk was invited to Teheran for meetings with key Iranian figures, including the Islamic Republic’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Rouhallah Khomeini. Unconfirmed reports claim that as a result of this meeting, Iran promised to provide Hamas with an annual $30 million subsidy as well as weapons and advanced military training at revolutionary guard facilities in Iran, Lebanon, and Sudan. Indicative of the deepening relationship, Hamas opened an office in Teheran in 1993 and announced that Iran and Hamas share an “identical view in the strategic outlook toward the Palestinian cause in its Islamic dimension.” The new era of a warmer Hamas-Iran relationship followed a change in Iranian self-perception from what Hillel Frisch called, “a religious Bolshevik revolution” into a “Stalinization of Iranian politics.” In the Stalinization period, Iran started to view itself as a radicalized state power and began its search for like-minded clients in the region. Yet even in this period, Iran stilled viewed Hamas as a relatively minor regional player since it enjoyed only 14-18 percent support within the Palestinian population. Moreover, Hamas looked weak to Iran after its expulsion from Jordan in 1999 and following its division into two branches in the West Bank and Damascus. Because of these limitations on Hamas’ power during this period (1992-2000), Iran chose to invest in Hezballah, which was strengthening its position in Lebanon. Iran continued to support Hamas during this period, but only to a degree. The third stage of the Iranian-Hamas relationship transformed the loose financial and military arrangements into a full-blown alliance. This stage followed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Palestinian violence since 2000, Arafat’s death in 2004, and Hamas’ electoral victory in January 2006. These events, and particularly Hamas’ rise to power, demonstrated to Iran that Hamas could become a more useful partner in helping Teheran realize its quest for regional hegemony. The new Hamas government which soon after coming to power found itself almost completely isolated internationally, gravitated toward Iran because both regimes shared an ideological Islamist Weltanschauung and because Tehran offered a lifeline to the Hamas’ leadership which was otherwise cut-off from other means of support. In December 2006, Palestinian Prime Minster Ismail Haniyeh stated publicly that “Iran constituted ‘stategic depth’ for the Palestinians,” the first time any declaration of support for Iran had been made openly by Hamas’ leadership. Hamas’s ties to Iran during this period have become so close that the intelligence chief of the rival PA government speculated that Iran masterminded and commended the Hamas’s coup against the Palestinian Authority in June 2007 and its violent takeover of Gaza. According to some analysts, Iran purposely fostered the relationship in order that the “final word” on matters regarding Israel would be Teheran’s, akin already to its relationship with Hezballah vis-à-vis Lebanon. Following the Money Trail: Iranian Financial Support to Hamas The central way in which Iran exercises its influence over Hamas is through the transfer of funds to its leadership. Iran is Hamas’s main backer, but is not its only source of support. Other, less generous, financial backers include the Arab states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. Hamas also collects funds in the form of contribution or levies from its supporters. It purportedly imposes a religious tax (zakat) of 2.5 percent on the wages of its members in the territories, sometimes threatening violence upon failure to comply. Teheran, however, remain Hamas’s central source of revenue. As mentioned previously, since 1993 Hamas has received an annual subsidy of approximately $30 million in addition to military training from Iran. Reports indicate that since then Iranian funding to the organization has increased significantly. In January 1995, in a testimony before the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, the outgoing Director of the Central Intellligence Committee, James Woolsey, said that Iran provided more than $100 million to Hamas without giving a time period over which those funds have been provided. The relationship became gradually stronger over the next decade and in February 2006 Farhat Assad, Hamas’s spokesman in the West Bank, announced that Iran told Hamas’s leader, Khaled Mashaal that Iran “was prepared to cover the entire deficit in the Palestinian budget, and [to do so] continuously” Iranian financial support to Hamas substantially increased after the organization’s elections victory in August 2005. Immediately following the elections the group’s Syria-based leader, Khaled Mashaal, visited Iran and re-affirmed the ideological affinity between Hamas and its Persian mentor and their joint agenda of advancing radical Islam. “Just as Islamic Iran defends the rights of the Palestinians,” he said, “we defend the rights of Islamic Iran. We are part of a united front against the enemies of Islam.” The financial expression of the close relationship soon followed. In the same month Iran pledged aid to the new Hamas-led Palestinian government and by November claimed that it has already given $120 million. During a visit by Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh to Tehran in December 2006, Iran decided to boost its ties to Hamas and pledged $250 million in aid as compensation for the Western boycott. Unlike previous grants this transfer of money was to continue on a regular basis to cover various PA expanses. The Iranian funding was designated in part to pay wages for civil servants and members of the security forces affiliated with Hamas, as well as to construct camps for the security forces and to compensate Palestinian families that lost their homes as a result of Israeli military operations. Saudi Arabia also promised assistance to the Palestinian Authority but demanded that Hamas accept the Arab peace initiative and, increasingly, that it severs itself from the Iranian influence – a relationship that elicits great concern among Arab countries. Iran’s support of Hamas at this period was not limited only to financial aid for domestic purposes. Hamas’ interior minister Said Sayyam visited Iran and Syrian in October 2006 where he received generous pledges of financial and military aid to improve the operational level of Hamas’ military wing, the Izz a-Din al-Kassam brigade. The commander of Hamas’ security force, Jamal Isma’il Daud Abdallah, also known as Abu Ubaida Al-Jarrah, has stated that Iran would train Palestinian operatives in its police training camps. Following Hamas’s violent takeover of Gaza in June 2007, when Hamas had lost nearly all of its sources of support, Iranian funds continued to infiltrate into Gaza despite international attempts to isolate the regime. Hamas and Iran simply found new and unique ways to transfer the money. A glimpse into the new methods employed by Hamas and Iran presently was provided by Hamas hard-liner, Mahmoud Zahar, who was quoted in June as telling a German news magazine that he had personally carried $42 million in cash from Iran across the Gaza-Egypt border. Iran’s Clients and Strategy in the Levant The strengthening of the alliance with Hamas is a key part of a larger Iranian strategy in the Levant. Since entering the Stalinist phase of its revolution, Iran employed a strategy of acquiring powerful regional clients through which it could carry its strategic and political goal of seeding Islamic revolution in Sunni Arab countries. This strategy is intended to engender the necessary conditions for the emergence of a modern super power caliphate to spearhead a holy jihad against the West, most notably the U.S. and Israel. Iran seeks clients with whom it shares an ideological outlook. Hamas fits this description since it does not seek an Islamic Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza only, but rather seeks to create an Islamic state to replace Israel and take over territories more broadly in much of the Levant. Likewise, Iran’s client Hezballah, operating in Lebanon, is not driven by local considerations alone but chiefly by the strategic ambitions of its primary state sponsor, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s regional clients, most notably Hezballah and Hamas, allow Iran to foment conflict in the region through proxy means. The prime example for this strategy has been the Israel-Hezballah war waged in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Hamas’ kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and its rockets assaults against southern Israel in June 2006 triggered in part Hizballah’s kidnapping of two IDF soldiers in northern Israel followed by rocket attacks from southern Lebanon in July which brought about the second Lebanon war. In many ways this war, in which the IDF’s performance was lackluster across the board, can be described as the First Israeli-Iranian war. Iran has also been able to use its clients to destabilize regional governments. Even after the Cedar revolution in March 2005 that forced Syrian forces out of Lebanon, Lebanon still had to address the destabilizing effects of the Hezballah’s military presence in south. The second Israeli-Lebanese war weakened the Lebanese government and threatened the democratic rule in the country. Likewise, Hamas’ electoral victory in the Palestinian territories so destabilized Palestinian politics that it eventually led to a Hamas coup against the PA and its hostile takeover of Gaza in June 2007. In both of these cases, Iran used its clients to carry out a strategy of destabilizing the Levant. Lebanon is still threatened by Hezballah as is Israel’s northern border. Despite the heavy losses that the organization suffered during the war, reports indicate that it is rebuilding and rearming rapidly and will soon be able to pose an even greater threat to Israel than previously thought. Hamas, through its growing base in Gaza, not only continues to threaten the PA in the West Bank, but also now threatens to destabilize Egypt, which has a significant population sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan, where there is a large Palestinian population as well as sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood, and Israel, which now finds itself outflanked and wedged between Hezballah in the north and Hamas in the south. More recently Iran has also employed a Sunni proxy group – Fatah al Islam – in Lebanon to further its strategy of weakening the Lebanese government. Fatah al Islam is a pro-Syrian Palestinian Islamist group that, according to Lebanese and Israeli officials, is supported and directed by Syria and Iran and has ties to al Qaeda. On May 20, 2007 violence broke out between Fatah al Islam and the Lebanese government after investigations into a bank robbery ended in a standoff between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Fatah al Islam in a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. Iran timed its attack to coincide with the Lebanese government's petition to the U.N. Security Council to establish an international tribunal to prosecute the suspected killers of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, assassinated on February 14, 2005. But the Fatah al Islam attack failed to intimidate the government of Lebanon into withdrawing its request and allowing Syria, Iran’s closest strategic ally, to evade international scrutiny. Despite the bloodshed, the Security Council voted on May 30, 2007 to establish a tribunal. Iran employs it clients as a part of a greater effort to seek regional domination both in Arab Shiites and Arab Sunni communities that it hopes to penetrate and incite. Various Sunni Arab regimes fear Iran’s growing influence among the various Shiite communities of the Middle East and that a radical Shiite crescent could emerge and topple moderate Arab states. King Abdallah II of Jordan first sounded the alarm in December 2004 when he spoke about a rising Shiite crescent that would overwhelm the Sunni Arab world. This crescent would encompass Iran, the newly empowered Shiite majority in Iraq, Syria whose ruling Alawite minority elite are recognized as Shiite by some Shiite clerics and finally Lebanon whose Shiite population is growing and where Hezballah’s influence is becoming more pervasive. Echoing Abdallah’s concerns, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated in April 2006 that “the Shiites are always loyal to Iran and not to the countries in which they live.” Iran’s outreach into Shiite community is only part of the threat that the Arab world perceives and that the West should be concerned about presently. Iran has revealed its readiness to work in conjunction with Sunni Islamists in order to further its ambitions. Iran has not limited itself to Sunni Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but has reached out to Sudan’s Sunni radical leader Hasan Turabi through its Lebanese proxy in the 1990s. Further evidence of Iran’s willingness to cooperate with Sunni radicals when it furthers its purposes can be found in the 9-11 commission report which talks about Iran’s cooperation with al Qaeda: “Iran facillated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and… some of these were future 9/11 hijackers.” The report adds that “al Qaeda members received advice and training from Hezballah.” After U.S. forces temporary defeated the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, many in al Qaeda network obtained refuge and assistance in Iran. Iran’s connection to radical Sunnis led it to instruct its Sunni proxy Hamas to cooperate with the Sunni al Qaeda and bring it into the West Bank. Although Hamas and al Qaeda differ in certain respects, most notably their approach to democratic participation (Hamas embraced using the democratic process to obtain political power and bolster its Islamist agenda while al Qaeda rejects any such participation) the two started cooperating in August 2005 in order to advance both organizations’ global agenda of defeating the West. Al Qaeda has been present in the Palestinian authority since at least August 2000, when Israel’s security services uncovered a terror network linked to al Qaeda and headed by Nabil Okal, a Hamas operative from Gaza who received military training in Osama bin Laden’s camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. After October 2005, the relationship between the two organizations became official and public when the Palestinian news agency Ma’an published a declaration in which al Qaeda revealed the establishment of a Gaza branch. The declaration states al Qaeda’s main goals as implementing Sharia (Islamic law), setting up a Sharia state, reviving the idea of the Caliphate in the hearts of Muslims, and working to create a world-wide Islamic caliphate. Some of the major events in the recent history of Hamas/al Qaeda cooperation include: Hamas’ foreign minister Mahmoud al Zahar meeting in Pakistan in June 2006 with Jamaat-e-Islami leader Qazi Hussein Ahmed, who had close contacts with bin Laden during the 1990s. The jihadi wing of Jamaat-e-Islami and al Qaeda have collaborated as well as have maintained financial links. Also two days after Israel publicized the arrest of two al Qaeda operatives in Nablus, PA chairman Abbas told Al Hayat (London) in March 2006 that he received intelligence information pointing to the presence of al Qaeda operatives in the West Bank and Gaza. These operatives, Azzam Abu al Ads and Bilal Hafnawy, were indicted for enlisting recruits to carry out terror attacks for al Qaeda and planning a two-pronged terror attack with a suicide bomber and a car bomb in Jerusalem. Members of the gang who were recruited by al Qaeda’s infrastructure in Irbid, Jordan, were arrested by Israeli security forces in December 2005. Thus it is faulty reasoning to maintain that international terrorist organizations will not cooperate with organizations whose religions and ideological backgrounds are at variance with their own. The case of Jordanian born terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi underscores this point. Even as the head of al Qaeda in Iraq and slaughterer of hundreds of Iraqi Shiites, he was also a recipient of Iranian assistance after 2001. More importantly, Iran’s cooperation with Sunni clients points to the fact that it is less interested in spreading radical Shiism per-se and more in fomenting a global, green, radical Islamist revolution. The threat in the Middle East today is not, as King Hussein asserted, the emergence of a Shiite crescent, but the rise of a radical Islamist force spearheaded by Iran that unites radical Sunnis and radical Shiites and creates a new paradigm of conflict with the West. Conclusions The new situation in the Middle East in which the radical Muslim world, Shiite and Sunni alike, unites under Iranian leadership to confront the West represents an enormous challenge for the Western world. During the last century the U.S. defined its foreign policy around deterring a hegemonic power and ideology from dominating the continent of Europe. The U.S. fought World War I and II and the Cold War in accordance with this premise. Today, Europe has been largely stabilized and the principal global threat stems from the present day Middle East. Iran in many ways is now replacing the former Soviet Union. Not only does it seek nuclear weapons, but it carries a radical ideology which is wishes to export. In so doing, it seeks to become the center of a new radical Islamic empire that wishes to confront the West, destroy its ideals, and eventually replace it as the world hegemon. In this new Middle East, in which the rise of a new Islamic force threatens the West and its allies, it is really futile to speak of a peace-process or a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The key conflict in the Middle East today is no longer simply the Palestinian issue and its solution will not come from another attempted agreement. The Israeli-Palestinian dimension of Middle Eastern politics has been eclipsed by the growing struggle between Islamism versus the West. It is this conflict that will shape the future not only of the Middle East, but also of the Western alliance. More specifically, the Iran-Hamas axis will eventually bring about more violence both to Israel and to other Western allies in the region. The writing of a Middle East plagued by instability and violence, and the threat it poses to the West, are already on the wall. Dr. Meyrav Wurmser is the Director of the Center for Middle East Policy and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington D.C. @ The Henry Jackson Society 2007 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Middle
East Volcano
On Sept. 6, something important
happened in northern Syria. Problem is, no one knows exactly what. Except
for those few who were involved, and they're not saying.
Which suggests that whatever happened near Dayr az Zawr was no accidental
intrusion into Syrian airspace, no dry run for an attack on Iran, no strike
on some conventional target such as an Iranian Revolutionary Guard base or a
weapons shipment on its way to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Which raises alarms for many
reasons. First, it would undermine the whole North Korean disarmament
process. Pyongyang might be selling its stuff to other rogue states or
perhaps just temporarily hiding it abroad while permitting ostentatious
inspections back home. Iranian Regime Increasingly Repressive and Corrupt
Washington, D.C.September 26, 2007 ; http://www.freedomhouse.org
21 September 2007
Note: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BALOCHISTAN & ICJ - Articulating the case and educating the West Guest Column by Nagesh Bhushan ; http://saag.org/papers24/paper2378.html The tone and tenor of a few Baloch groups, particularly individuals who started heckling the Khan of Kalat Mr. Mir Suleman Daud Khan and others over their desire to take the Baloch case to the ICJ, is cynical and ignorant of the long term benefits that this action could fetch for the Baloch. The ground reality in the West is very perplexing. People in America, for example, still ask where Balochistan is--often they think it is a central Asian country. Also, even less is known about the Baloch people, who regard themselves as secular and have never used religion in their struggle for freedom. Needless to mention, in the West, Balochistan is synonymous with Al-Qaeda and terrorism, thanks to the Pakistani administration?s consistent efforts to blur the line between Al-Qaeda terrorism and the uprising of the Baloch people in an effort to win their rights. Below content is compiled based on the discussions in some popular Baloch egroups. ANTI-ICJ: It's a waste of time and diversion from the original objectives; this should not be viewed as major development, instead as a small contribution to baloch cause. It will take another 60 years to collect that money for filing the case.
PRO-ICJ : First , this is a negative attitude and counter productive . Those who do not help , should not bark on others who are doing something small or big. The Jirga called by Khan of Kalat's was a big boost to Baloch struggle. It has shut down the Government rhetoric and Musharraf's propagand that Baloch struggle is only of three sardars.
Second, it shows the world that Balochistan was illegally and forcefully annexed to Pakistan.
Third ,it brought all the baloch tribes under one banner and unify , which so called "baloch nationalist leaders" have failed to do so and also to bring the Baloch masses under on platform.
Fourth, the decision to take the case to ICJ is a big slap on the face of Pakistan and its importance to internationalize Baloch struggle on international level.
Taking the case to ICJ is either a big contribution or small that is a different story, but it is not a bad idea . While it may be possible that the Baloch can achieve their goals without outside moral or financial support, it is also possible that the Baloch will find they want the support of the West. To win this support, the case and logic behind the cause must be articulated and the people of the West educated. While taking the Baloch case through the courts, or simply expressing one's desire to take it through the courts, may lead to nothing but publicity, that publicity can be used to educate those whose support they seek. As hypocritical as it might be, resistance or guerrilla groups do NOT generally win the support of those who hold power in the West--unless those in power can use the resistance for their own purposes, as they did with the Afghan mujahids against Russia. The Che Guevara?s or Zapatistas of the world who fight to correct economic, political and social injustices threaten Western power structures and those in power often try to marginalize such movements by criticizing their efforts in the media. The very bold move to shepherd this case through the ICJ courts, however, will ultimately help the Baloch control the media spin in the West to some degree. Critics of this move should understand that the opponent has a game plan. That game plan includes characterizing the Baloch as terrorists. And given how badly informed the West is about Baloch history and its people, the opponent has to do little more than publicize the videotape of Rigi beheading a person in the Willem Marx documentary, for example, and Rigi will be seen as a terrorist. And by association, so will the Baloch resistance. Do not count on people in the West to take the time to educate themselves. Journalist Annie Nocenti who visited Balochistan says "But the question is whether or not the ICJ can give fair hearing to Balochistan, a tribal province without clear sovereign status, now that Pakistan has become a nation of international standing. Which is why it is imperative that such a move is backed in the press. The alternative, if an appeal to the ICJ fails, is likely to be armed struggle." In the end, while the big powers might not support the Baloch cause (unless they can use it to their advantage), there are plenty of activists who will, and together activists can help sway public opinion, but they need to know what they are supporting and why. The ICJ is a very good international public venue for this purpose--informing the West about Balochistan. In the end, outside support cannot hurt the cause so why not pursue it, too? Rationale behind the Grand Jirga A Grand Jirga (meeting of clan chiefs) of Baloch tribals , convened last year after 136 years, by present Khan of Kalat Mr. Mir Suleman Daud Khan was attended by 95 tribal sardars and 300 other important "notables" . They announced in a declaration that a case would be filed in the ICJ --International Court of Justice for violation of the accord signed by the state of Kalat and the government of Pakistan in 1948. Soon after the event , Khan of Kalat speaking to Journalist Annie Nocenti expressing satisfaction for reciprocating his call by all Sardars and notables, he said ?Baloch was a nation and is a nation ?(thebaluch.com , Video) . Implying it is an endorsement that baloch will present their case as ?state of Kalat?, though not a member of UN. However, article 34 of the Statute of the ICJ, which is part of the Charter of the United Nations, says: - "Only States may be parties in cases before the Court". This author received a email from Information department regarding this , reproduced below . When this was raised with Dr.Wahid Baloch, President of Baloch Society of North America, he said ?I also got a similar letter ...but speaking to lawyers who will be handling the case they told me there are exceptions to our case? . He further added "we are relying on our expert lawyers and we will use every avenue to move forward with our case?. UN Article 93 (2) and Article 35 (2) Article 93, Para 2, of the Charter of UN which empowers the General Assembly to determine the conditions on which a state not a member of UN , may become a party to the Statute of the court . Article 93 , Para 2 says: ?A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.? We wish to reproduce an excerpt of "ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF PRACTICE" of ARTICLE 93 During the discussion 8/ in the Security Council and its Committee of Experts of the request of Liechtenstein to learn the conditions upon which it could become a party to the Statute of the Court, the objection was raised that Liechtenstein was not a sovereign State, since it had yielded important parts of its sovereignty to Switzerland. The arguments set forth below were among those adduced in support of that view, (l) Liechtenstein did not conduct its foreign affairs independently, but did so only through Switzerland. (2) Liechtenstein was a member of a customs union with Switzerland, which meant that it was not autonomous in the matter of customs.(3) Liechtenstein did not have its own currency. (U) Liechtenstein did not have a postal system, its postal affairs being handled by Switzerland. (5) The administration of the telegraph system of Liechtenstein was also in the hands of Switzerland.(6) Liechtenstein did not have an army of its own. (?) The League of Nations had refused to permit Liechtenstein to become a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The majority of the Committee of Experts and of the Security Council, however, was of the opinion 9/ that Liechtenstein was a State within the meaning of Article 93 (2). The arguments set forth "below were among those advanced in support of that opinion. (l) Most writers and jurists considered Liechtenstein as a State. (2) It had a population, a Government and a constitution. (3) The customs union treaty between Liechtenstein and Switzerland did not affect the independence of the former; the treaty stated that the customs union was without prejudice to the sovereign right of the Prince of Liechtenstein. (k) The fact that Switzerland represented Liechtenstein in foreign countries did not affect the sovereignty of the latter; there were several undoubted States which relied on the diplomatic service of other States. The Security Council by a vote of 9 to none, with 2 abstentions, adopted the draft resolution recommended for adoption by the Committee of Experts and setting forth theconditions in question for Liechtenstein Source: The question whether an applicant was a "state" withinthemeaning of Article 93 (2) Further Article 35 (2) says " A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter " Therefore , it is appropriate for Khan of Kalat to consider an attempt to make use of the court to decide this point .In this regard if an attempt were to be made by Baloch leaders they should decide which of the above 2 -- Article 35 (2) OR Article 93 (2) -- should be adopted . Baloch intellectuals should make use of these available avenues without taking these emails seriously. Pakistan may raise preliminary objections similar to what Mrs.Laurence Blairon of Information Department mentioned. However this matter will be decided by the court. Not to mention the Agreements signed by Khan of Kalat --dated (11th April 1952) and (1st January 1955) will be void, as they were signed under duress. Only Instrument of accession signed on 27th March 1948 will be taken into consideration, as per my well informed source. Therefore Baloch leaders should make an attempt by presenting their case before ICJ . Now, the legal team of Baloch, which is preparing the case , baloch intellectuals face an uphill in order to craft an effective strategy . Annexure: Secretary of the Court has sent the following mail regarding this . Dear Sir, Today I read an article on your website entitled "Balochistan case is ready to be filed at International Court of Justice". As Head of the Information Department of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is mentioned in the article, I wish in this respect to clarify matters. The Court's activities are limited to rendering judgments in legal disputes between States submitted to it by the States themselves and giving advisory opinions when it is so requested by UN organs or specialized agencies of the UN system. Article 34 of the Statute of the Court, which is part of the Charter of the United Nations, provides: "Only States may be parties in cases before the Court". At the moment, these are the 192 Member States of the United Nations only. It follows that neither the Court nor its Members can consider applications from private individuals or groups, provide them with legal advice or assist them in their relations with the authorities of any country. I trust you will find this information useful. Yours faithfully, Laurence Blairon (Mme | Mrs.) Secr鴡ire de la Cour | Secretary of the Court Chef du d鰡rtement de l'information | Head of the Information Department Cour internationale de Justice | International Court of Justice Palais de la Paix | Peace Palace Carnegieplein 2 2517 KJ La Haye | The Hague Pays-Bas | The Netherlands T: + 31 (0)70 302 23 36 F: + 31 (0)70 302 23 38 E: information@icj-cij.org Site Internet | website: www.icj-cij.org
(The author is an analyst with many years of
experience of study on the developments in South Asia and also blogs at
intellibriefs.com covering Geopolitics, Security & Intelligence. The views
expressed by the author are his own. He can be reached at
intellibriefs@gmail.com) |