حزب مردم بلوچستان  Balochistan People’s Party  بلوچستانءِ اُستمانءِ گــَل

 


What Israel Really Gained by Bombing Syria

Statecraft
By Dennis Ross ; http://www.tnr.com/

Sometimes in international relations it is good to preserve mystery. The irony is that often when an action has been taken but not admitted, everyone seems to know anyway. That certainly seems to be the case with Israel's military strike against a target in northern Syria.

The Israelis aren't talking about it or acknowledging anything. The Syrians are describing an episode in which they fired on Israeli aircraft, the aircraft dropped something, and fled Syrian airspace. The President of the United States won't comment on the event--of course, by not denying it, he leaves the impression that something significant absolutely took place.

And, it appears, something did. The sketchy reports that have emerged, again all citing anonymous sources in Israel or in the intelligence community here, are that Israel took out a facility in northern Syria in which North Korea was helping Syria develop a nuclear capability. The absence of leaks coming out of Israel lends credence to the reports. Israel used to be one of the best keepers of secrets. Excluding this episode, it has become one of the worst. Everything seems to leak--and not in drips, but in torrents. (Once when I was negotiating, the Israeli prime minister at the time insisted on a one-on-one meeting with me because, he told me, this was the only way he could ensure that nothing would leak out of the meeting. He wasn't concerned with my side, but his.)

In this case, Israel has played it very smartly. Much is being made about the silence of Arab criticism of the apparent Israeli raid and what it says about Arab attitudes toward Syria. In fact, had Israel taken credit for the raid, Arab states would have felt duty-bound to condemn it, Israel's resort to force, and its unilateral effort to impose its will once again.

Why would Israel carry out such a raid now? Anything involving a Syrian nuclear development is going to be a concern for the Israelis--and their threshold of tolerance is going to be low. Israel has tracked the North Korea-Syrian military relationship very closely for a long time. North Korea has provided Syria with advanced missile technology and surface-to-surface rockets of increasing range, accuracy, and payload. Moreover, the Israelis know that North Korea has practically never developed a weapons system that it has not sold. Given that history, North Korea's nuclear developments and continuing military cooperation with Syrian has drawn extremely close Israeli scrutiny.

So, on one level the Israeli raid simply reflected an effort to blunt North Korean-Syrian nuclear development before it could allow the Syrians to develop a nuclear capability. But that is only part of the story.

The Israeli security establishment has become increasingly concerned about significant Syrian weapons acquisitions, forward deployment of forces, training exercises, and directives about a possible war. Israeli military officials to whom I have spoken have become convinced that Syria's president, Bashar al Assad, has begun to believe that he could fight a limited war against Israel. Using as many as 20,000 rockets--with some chemically armed as a reserve and a deterrent to prevent Israel from striking at the strategic underpinnings of his regime--he appears, at least according to many in Israel's intelligence community, to believe he could fight a war on his terms. He was impressed by what Hezbollah did in the war with Israel in the summer of 2006 and believes he, too, could win by not losing in a limited war.

Israel has been looking for ways to convince Assad that he is miscalculating; that he will not be allowed to fight a war on his terms; and that he had better not play with fire. This summer, Israel has conducted military exercises designed not just to improve Israel's readiness but to convey a message to Assad. The raid not only blunts Syria's nuclear development but also reinforces the Israeli message of deterrence. In effect, it tells President Assad that Syria has few secrets it can keep from Israel. For a conspiratorial and paranoid regime, this is bound to keep its leaders preoccupied internally trying to figure out what Israel knows and doesn't know.

Beyond this, the raid sends the message that Israel can hit what it wants--no matter how valuable and sensitive to the regime--when it wants, and Syria is powerless to stop it. Here the silence from the Arab world, even if a function of Israel's silence, can provide small comfort to President Assad. No one in the Arab world much cares if Syria suffers blows to its prestige and losses to its military capabilities.

So, the raid is as much about preemption of a potential nuclear threat as it is about reestablishing Israel's deterrent in the eyes of the Syrian regime. Indeed, Major General Amos Yadlin, the head of Israel's military intelligence, was quoted as telling the Israeli cabinet that Israel had "restored its deterrence."

From this standpoint, Israel may also have had Iran in mind. The press is now reporting that an accident took place in July in Syria at a chemical plant at which a number of Iranian experts were killed. Perhaps this is just a coincidence. Or perhaps Israel is also sending messages to Iran that it has the capacity, and more importantly, the will to protect itself from those who would seek to threaten it with weapons of mass destruction.

At a time when Iran appears to be determined to press ahead with its nuclear program and may have doubted Israel's will to do anything about it, Israel may well be acting to show it will do whatever it takes to ensure its security. With the United States bogged down in Iraq and apparently unable or unwilling to prevent Iran's nuclear developments, the Israelis may be signaling everyone, including the Bush Administration, that if the international community doesn't take more decisive action, it will.

Statecraft involves using all the tools of the state to affect the behavior of friends and foes alike. Israel's raid against the Syrian plant reflects the use of a military instrument applied quite selectively to effect the psychologies of many different actors on the world stage. Whether it will have the effect the Israelis desire remains to be seen. But for now, the Israelis have made a statement without triggering a wider conflict in the process.

Dennis Ross is counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of Statecraft: And How to Restore America's Standing in the World.
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Iran's New Fighter

An impressive technological feat--from 1959.
By Reuben F. Johnson ; 09/25/2007 ; http://www.weeklystandard.com/

Beijing
IN THE MIDST of recriminations over Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speech at Columbia, the Iranian head of state has sent signals this past week that rather than trying to find a diplomatic solution with Washington and its European allies he will continue to maintain a defiant and belligerent stance over Teheran's weapons programs.

The latest in a series of "messages" being sent to the West is the news reported this past week of Ahmadinejad presiding over a military parade that featured a cornucopia of weapon systems now in the hands of the Iranian armed forces. Among these was a new Iranian-designed and produced fighter aircraft, the Sa'eqeh (Lightning), which had just begun series-production in August according to Iran's official state news outlets.

Amadinejad told the crowd, which was assembled to commemorate the 27th anniversary of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, that "those (countries) who assume that decaying methods such as psychological war, political propaganda and the so-called economic sanctions would work and prevent Iran's fast drive toward progress are mistaken."

His statements were in reference to the embargo on Teheran for all sales of arms, spare parts, or any other military technology--sanctions that have existed since the overthrow of the Shah's government by the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Since that time Iran's armed forces have struggled to keep an ever-aging arsenal of U.S. weaponry functioning, almost all of which was purchased under the Shah more than three decades ago.

Being cut off from any legal means of supporting this military hardware put Iran in a difficult spot when Iraq decided to wage war on the new Islamic Republic, and forced its defence industry to become as self-sufficient as possible. The Sa'eqeh is the culmination of almost 30 years of effort to achieve that self-sufficiency.

The Iranian president boasted that "those who prevented Iran, at the height of the war [with Iraq] from getting even barbed wire must see now that all the equipment on display today has been built by the mighty hands and brains of experts at Iran's armed forces."

However, do not rush to write your congressional representatives to suggest that Washington respond to this new threat by doubling the U.S. Air Force's buy of Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor fighter jets. A closer look at the aircraft shows that its primary significance is symbolic--the first military aircraft to ever be designed and produced in Iran--and that it is not a modern-age weapon system.

The Sa'eqeh is based almost entirely on the old Northrop F-5 fighter aircraft, the chief U.S. export fighter of the 1960s and 70s, 166 of which were sold to Iran before the revolution. After the embargo was initiated the Iranian armed forces were able to purchase spares through illegal channels and on the arms black market since the F-5 had been widely exported to numerous nations friendly to the United States and there were any number of parts depots around the world.

In one case Iran was able to purchase F-5s and a large stock of spare parts from Ethiopia. The African nation had initially purchased the aircraft from Vietnam. The communist government in Hanoi had captured these aircraft from the South Vietnamese air force when they took Saigon, but had no use for them since the new, re-united Vietnam's arsenal was almost all of Soviet make and design.

However, Ethiopia could not sustain the aircraft's operation and sold 18 of them--along with several spare parts sets--to Iran through a British front company, which camouflaged the sale by making it a transaction not to the Islamic Republic's MoD but instead to the National Iranian Oil Company.

The ability to obtain parts, spare engines, and other components for the F-5 despite the embargo, plus the facilities to overhaul the aircraft that had been established in Iran in the previous decade, gave Iranian industry a full-spectrum education on the design and operation of this aircraft. The F-5 became the basis of a program to develop a new, "indigenous" fighter, which has produced several prototypes under different designators until arriving at the configuration of the Sa'eqeh.

The aircraft is outwardly a copy of the F-5 that has been enlarged proportionally by 10-15 percent, with the other chief difference being that Iranian engineers have changed the aircraft's single vertical tail into twin verticals that are canted outward in the same style as the Boeing F/A-18 Hornet. The internal systems of the aircraft are reported to be a mix of copies of older-generation U.S. technology and 1980s/early 1990s Russian avionics.

But despite its rather humble origins and two-generations ago technology, Iranian officials have spared no hyperbole in public statements about the Sa'eqeh.

Defence Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar told Iranian state TV that the "two Sa'eqeh jets were tested successfully by air force pilots ... The test scared Iran's enemies." He later said that the two jets would officially join the
country's fleet of warplanes to be on guard against a possible U.S. attack. "We have reached the cutting edge of designing new generation fighter jets."

The chief of Iran's armed forces, Ataollah Salehi. said the test flights proved that "Iran, with its advanced equipment and capabilities, is fully prepared for any possible aggression." He and others also rate the Sa'eqeh as being "more powerful" than the U.S. F/A-18.

But, cursory analysis shows these proclamations to be short on reality and long on propaganda. The Sa'eqeh--aside from being a copy of yesterday's military technology and less powerful than the oldest fighter in the U.S. or Israeli air forces--is entirely for show. Nothing makes that clearer than how the aircraft that flew during the parade were painted. Instead of sporting some combat-ready camouflage they were instead decked out in a bright blue and yellow color scheme that itself seemed to mimic that of the U.S. Navy's Blue Angels demonstration team. In other words, perfect for wooing a crowd of spectators on the Ayatollah's birthday, but useless for combat operations.

Sadly, the aircraft itself and the official statements about it are symbols not only of the regime's continued isolation, but how much that isolation has cost the country and its people in terms of economic development.

To proclaim that a replica of a 40-plus year old American aeroplane is a technological marvel shows just how far behind Iran is compared with the rest of the world--and how difficult it will be to catch up once it does re-integrate itself with the community of civilized nations. Ahmadinejad and those around him need to change course before his entire country becomes just like the nation's defence industrial base: a museum of manufactured obsolescence.

Reuben F. Johnson is a contributor to THE WORLDWIDE STANDARD.

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Ahmadinejad and international law

By IRWIN COTLER ; 13-10-2007 ; http://www.jpost.com/

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent visit to the United States and the UN was no less than a three-act play in the Theater of the Absurd. While it has been argued that his command performances at the UN, Columbia University and in the media further exposed his absurdity, critics need to look behind and beyond the on-stage theatrics, lest we ignore the depth of his regime's criminality and the suffering of the Iranian people.

Now that the curtain has fallen, the question becomes: What are the lessons to be learned and actions to be taken?

Arguably, there are three lessons to be learned, each corresponding with the acts in the Theater of the Absurd, and each with a lesson anchored in the rule of law; more particularly, in the disregard of the rule of law.

First, President Ahmadinejad should have been declared an inadmissible person and placed on the "United States's Watchlist" of persons barred from entering the country. For American law excludes from entry any person who has engaged in, or incited to, terrorist activity, or who "has used his position of prominence to endorse or espouse terrorist activity in a way that undermines United States' efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities."

The evidence of Iran's complicity in terrorist activity is clear and compelling. Ahmadinejad's Iran has recruited, trained, financed, instigated and armed its terrorist proxies such as Hamas, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad, whose platforms and policies are replete with genocidal calls and terrorist activity that outdo even its Iranian patron.

Moreover, Ahmadinejad is in standing violation of the Genocide Conventions prohibition against the "direct and public incitement to genocide," which alone should be cause for exclusion. If it be argued that no precedent exists for excluding an sitting president, it should be recalled that Austrian president Kurt Waldheim was placed on the "US Watchlist" for his participation in the persecution of civilian populations during the Second World War.

THE SECOND Act in this Theater of the Absurd was the invitation extended to Ahmadinejad to address Columbia University. This was not a matter of academic freedom. Columbia was not obliged to give Ahmadinejad a podium; rather, given his criminality, it was obliged not to give him a podium. Nor was this a matter of "free speech;" incitement to commit genocide is not protected speech. Indeed, it is a violation of international criminal law - including not only the Genocide Conventions but the International Criminal Court Treaty.

In fact, the best evidence for not inviting Ahmadinejad to Columbia was set forth in the "introduction" by Columbia's President Lee Bollinger of Ahmadinejad , which was more indictment than introduction, and appeared more as an exculpatory disclaimer - however discourteous - for the wrongful judgment to invite Ahmadinejad to begin with.

Further, the "justification" offered for the invitation by Columbia University Dean John Coatsworth - that he would have given Hitler a platform - was devoid of any moral compass.

Third, and most disturbing, Ahmadinejad should not have been a welcome guest at the United Nations General Assembly. He should have been - and should be - the object of a criminal indictment, the elements for which can be found in Lee Bollinger's own introduction.

A PERSON who incites to genocide; who is complicit in crimes against humanity; who continues the pursuit of the most destructive of weaponry in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions; who warns Muslims who support Israel that they will "burn in the umma of Islam;" who is engaged in a massive repression of human rights in Iran; who assaults the basic tenants of the UN Charter - such a person belongs in the dock of the accused, rather than the podium of the UN General Assembly.

But it is not enough to lament what occurred in this Theater of the Absurd, or even to learn its lessons. It is important to act on those lessons so as to restore respect for the rule of law and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, fidelity to the UN Charter, and the struggle against impunity. Accordingly, the following actions should be undertaken with all deliberate speed:

State parties to the Genocide Convention, such as Canada, have not only a right, but a responsibility, to enforce the convention, particularly as regards the prevention of genocide.

State parties should therefore refer the criminal incitement to genocide by President Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders to the appropriate UN agencies. It is astonishing that this criminal incitement has yet to be addressed by the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, or any other body or agency of the United Nations, though it has found fit to give him a podium.

State parties should initiate, in the International Court of Justice, an inter-state complaint against Iran - for its "direct and public incitement to genocide" in violation of the Genocide Convention, to which Iran is party.

The crimes of President Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders should be referred by the UN Security Council to the special prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for investigation and prosecution.

State parties should prepare criminal indictments of President Ahmadinejad, former president Rafsanjani, and other Iranian leaders on the basis of the "Universal Jurisdiction" principle embodied in the Genocide Convention.

The UN Secretary General should refer President Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders to the UN Security Council, on the basis of their threats to international peace and security, pursuant to Article 99 of the UN Charter.

PRESIDENT Ahmadinejad and other designated Iranian leaders should be placed on a "watchlist" by concerned countries, preventing their entrance as "inadmissible persons." There is presently discussion about holding Iran accountable for its defiance of UN Security Council resolutions calling for the suspension of its uranium-enrichment process. The recommended options have included everything from UN sanctions to possible military strikes. It is time that the above juridical options was initiated, which might also embolden progressive forces within Iran while holding the responsible individuals accountable.

Indeed, recent history has taught us that sustained international juridical remedies can bring about the indictment of seemingly immune dictators, such as Slobodan Milosevic and Augusto Pinochet, and such actions are clearly preferable to military options.

This is an opportunity for countries such as the United States and Canada to exercise necessary leadership in regard to one of the most important threats confronting the international community today.

The writer is Opposition Critic for Human Rights and former minister of justice and attorney-general of Canada and professor of law at McGill University.
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Pakistan Seen Losing Fight Against Taliban And Al-Qaeda

By Griff Witte ; Washington Post Foreign Service ; 14-Oct-2007;

PESHAWAR, Pakistan -- Pakistan's government is losing its war against emboldened insurgent forces, giving al-Qaeda and the Taliban more territory in which to operate and allowing the groups to plot increasingly ambitious attacks, according to Pakistani and Western security officials.

The depth of the problem has become clear only in recent months, as regional peace deals have collapsed and the government has deferred developing a new strategy to defeat insurgents until Pakistan's leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, can resolve a political crisis that threatens his presidency.

Meanwhile, radical Islamic fighters who were evicted from Afghanistan by the 2001 U.S.-led invasion have intensified a ruthless campaign that has consumed Pakistan's tribal areas and now affects its major cities. Military officials say the insurgents have enhanced their ability to threaten not only Pakistan but the United States and Europe as well.

"They've had a chance to regroup and reorganize," said a Western military official in Pakistan. "They're well equipped. They're clearly getting training from somewhere. And they're using more and more advanced tactics."

Pakistan's military, on the other hand, is considering pulling back from the fight -- at least partially -- in the face of mounting losses, the official said.

"They're not trained for a counterinsurgency. It's not their number one priority. It's not even their number two priority," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "These are the reasons things aren't going their way."

Pakistani military officials concede they are searching for a new strategy now that the old one has gone awry. But with Musharraf struggling to stay in office and expected to soon step down from the military, no decisions are likely until questions over the country's leadership are settled.

"The federal government is busy with its problem of legitimacy. Getting Musharraf elected for another five years -- that is keeping everything on hold," said retired Brig. Gen. Mehmood Shah, who until 2005 was a top security official in the tribal areas.

In recent years, Pakistan has relied on deals with insurgents to keep them from launching offensives. But two such agreements -- in North and South Waziristan -- fell apart this summer when insurgent leaders abruptly announced they were backing out.

The main criticism of the deals, both in Pakistan and in the West, had been that they gave al-Qaeda and the Taliban sanctuary in which to train, plot and launch attacks.

Now, security experts say Pakistan is paying the price for not confronting the problem head-on, with insurgent groups capitalizing on their newfound strength.

Last month, a suicide bomber attacked a bus carrying workers with the nation's hugely influential spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, killing 22 people. Just a week later, a bomber reportedly wearing a military uniform breached one of the most secure army installations in the country, where elite commandos train. The assailant detonated his explosives in the officers' mess during dinnertime, leaving 17 soldiers dead.

The latest blows came Monday, when a suicide bomber killed 15 people, including four policemen, in the northwestern town of Bannu. Late Monday night, more than 20 Frontier Corps troops went missing after their post near Bannu came under attack.

The insurgent strikes represent a humiliating breakdown in security for the world's sixth-largest army. But most embarrassing is the fact that about 250 soldiers remain in Taliban hands more than a month after they were taken hostage.

The soldiers were traveling in a supply convoy through the hostile terrain of South Waziristan on Aug. 30 when their route was blocked by a group of local fighters. Although they were vastly outnumbered, the fighters managed to persuade the soldiers to surrender without firing a shot. Since then, the government has been unable to win the soldiers' freedom because the Taliban is seeking major concessions.

"This kidnapping is a lesson to the government to honor its peace deal with us," said Zulfiqar Mehsud, a spokesman for the Taliban, which blames the government for violating the agreement. Mehsud's group wants to transform Pakistan into a radical Islamic state modeled after Afghanistan before the 2001 U.S.-led invasion.

The troops' surrender has called into question the army's commitment to fighting an unpopular war that requires Pakistanis to kill their countrymen. It has also exposed the army to ridicule.

"In Waziristan, people are laughing at the army," said Lateef Afridi, a tribal elder and lawyer. "I really feel pity for these soldiers."

One of those soldiers, Najmul Hasan, 29, recently spent 50 days in Taliban captivity in Waziristan. "The ringleaders would threaten on a daily basis to behead us if the government didn't release their members," Hasan said. He and two others eventually escaped, but other soldiers were, in fact, beheaded. The Taliban videotaped one such incident in which an execution was carried out by a teenage boy.

While Waziristan is believed to be the operational headquarters for the insurgency, militant groups have expanded their reach significantly over the past year. They now have a firm grip not only on the tribal areas that line the Afghan border but on other sections of northwest Pakistan as well.

Residents of this frontier city are beginning to feel besieged, with the surrounding countryside falling under insurgents' sway and assailants occasionally carrying out attacks in Peshawar.

Even hard-line religious leaders are not safe. Last month, one of Peshawar's most prominent clerics, Maulana Hassan Jan, was assassinated as he rode in his car to evening prayers. Although he had been outspoken in his criticism of the United States and was revered among many who want to bring Islamic law to Pakistan, he was not radical enough to satisfy insurgent groups, who are blamed for his killing. He had, for instance, shunned the pro-Taliban clerics at Islamabad's Red Mosque, or Lal Masjid, when they instigated an armed standoff with the government in July.

"Traditional religious and political leaders are losing ground because people consider them very soft against Pervez Musharraf and America," said Qibla Ayaz, dean of the Islamic studies program at Peshawar University. "Among the youth, their influence is weakening."

The United States has pumped about $10 billion into Pakistan since 2001, the vast majority of it for the military. But the aid does not seem to have won the United States many friends here. Nor has it successfully prepared the Pakistani army to battle insurgents.

"The sad thing about it is that a lot of these militants are better off than the Frontier Corps," said the Western official, referring to the Pakistani force that is supposed to be on the front lines fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The militants "have rockets. They have advanced weapons. And the Frontier Corps has sandals and a bolt-action rifle."

Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has sought to exploit the Pakistani military's deficiencies and its unpopular ties to the United States. Last month, he released an unusual audio recording in which he focused almost all of his wrath on Musharraf and called on Pakistanis to overthrow their government.

Shah, the retired general, said that knowing how strong al-Qaeda has become, Pakistani officials are deluding themselves if they think insurgents will back down anytime soon.

"Pakistan should have no doubt about what these people have done, and what they can do," he said. "They have declared war on Pakistan. Now the army must make a war plan."

Special correspondents Imtiaz Ali in Peshawar and Kamran Khan in Karachi, Pakistan, contributed to this report.
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Syria, Seeking Investors, Turns Cautiously to Iran

By HUGH NAYLOR ; 13-Oct-2007 ; http://www.nytimes.com/

DAMASCUS, Syria, Oct. 3 — Ahmed Ansare likes to think of himself as a pioneer.

His petroleum recycling business, the Damascus Petrochemical Refinery Company, was the first private Iranian company to set foot in Syria, the first of many, it now seems.

“Billions of dollars of Iranian projects are expected to be coming here now,” Mr. Ansare, an Iranian citizen who started operations here in 2003, said in impeccable Arabic as he lounged on a khaki-colored couch at his office in Damascus.

From car manufacturing plants and a proposed $2 billion industrial zone for Iranian businesses, to plans to overhaul urban transportation systems, Iranian companies are charging into Syria, looking to cash in on a recent privatization push by Damascus.

Weighed down by a behemoth public sector, an influx of nearly two million Iraqi refugees and falling oil production, Syria’s leaders are trying to liberalize their economy in hopes of avoiding a financial meltdown.

In another time, the privatization effort might have presented an opportunity for the United States and Europe to use their enormous commercial muscle to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, Washington’s foremost antagonists in the region.

But the United States imposed sanctions in 2004 as punishment for Syrian support of militant Palestinian and Lebanese organizations. These banned American exports to Syria and gave President Bush the added option of outlawing American investment in the country, effectively scaring off American and other Western companies.

At the same time, Iran, the subject of two recent rounds of United Nations sanctions for its suspected nuclear weapons ambitions and a long boycott by the United States, has few opportunities to invest abroad. The end result, Western diplomats and analysts say, is that Washington has effectively pushed Damascus and Tehran into deepening their alliance of nearly three decades.

“It’s logical why we have been working much closer with the Iranians,” said Mustafa Alkafri, head of the Syrian Investment Agency, a government body. “We’re both under the American blockade.”

The Syrian government estimates that Iranian investment in 2006 alone surged to more than $400 million, making Tehran the third-largest foreign investor here, behind Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Though exact figures are unavailable, by some estimates Iran has invested a total of $3 billion in Syria, most of that in the last few years.

In September, officials from both countries announced plans to expand Iranian projects in Syria to $10 billion over the next five years, which would cast Tehran as the economic powerhouse here.

The countries’ growing economic ties are reinforced by cultural ties, with more than half a million Iranian tourists, mainly pilgrims, flocking to shrines in Syria every year.

“Syria looks a lot like the Iranian presence in Najaf,” said Vali Nasr, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, referring to the Shiite holy city in Iraq. “You have businesses springing up that cater to Iranian pilgrims, which deepen personal relationships that continue to grow and evolve into partnerships.”

Syria’s sudden interest in foreign investment, and Iran’s eagerness to supply it, springs from an emerging economic crisis here. Food and energy subsidies, for instance, are predicted to cost $7 billion next year, almost 20 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, but the state has been unable to increase tax collections significantly.

“We didn’t know how drastic the situation was until recently,” said Andrew Tabler, editor of Syria Today magazine. “Syria has no choice but to follow the liberalization path.”

But according to Mr. Tabler, American sanctions “are preventing the U.S. from using the one lever of influence it has right now, which is economics.”

Some analysts doubt that assertion, saying that political issues dividing the United States and Syria — from Israel to the activities of Hezbollah, the Syrian-backed Shiite party that Washington considers a terrorist group — need to be settled before Syria will ever begin reconsidering its growing ties with Iran.

And even in the absence of sanctions, a jungle of red tape in Damascus and political turmoil in nearby Lebanon and Iraq would still give American investors pause.

Bureaucratic obstacles are said to be holding up a number of Iranian projects, with several stuck in the planning stages. “In general, it’s much easier and more profitable to invest in places like Egypt and Jordan,” said Jihad Yazigi, editor of The Syria Report, an online Syrian economic journal.

But none of that has dampened the zeal of Iranian companies, in part, many here say, because of backing from Tehran.

State-owned and even privately held Iranian companies often have links to political figures like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a financial oligarch and former president of Iran, and even the Revolutionary Guards, according to Mr. Nasr, of the Fletcher School.

“There is no doubt that Iranian economic expansion is going to markets where there are political interests,” Mr. Nasr said.

This form of state-led capitalism allows Tehran to direct its investments more easily in its desired sphere of influence, he said, much like President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela’s neosocialist agenda across Latin America. Places like western Afghanistan and southern Iraq, for instance, war zones that are considered too perilous for most investors, are flush with Iranian-made goods.

“At one level, Iranian investment is strategic,” Mr. Nasr said. “At another, it’s simply based on economic opportunity. But you can bet that Rafsanjani won’t pass up a chance to invest in Syria.”

That has some Syrians concerned. One senior adviser to the Syrian government, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss such matters, said it was no coincidence that Iran was investing in strategic industries like concrete production and power generation.

“These industries are vital and would give the Iranians a huge say,” the adviser said.

In addition to these projects, he said Syria was considering having Iranian companies manage the nationwide A.T.M. network, print Syrian passports and supervise a proposed system to allocate monthly allotments of food subsidies using debit cards.

“These projects will give them knowledge about all of us, even our personal spending behavior,” the adviser said. “This isn’t just about profit — it’s about influence.”

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Available Options for Iran

By Walid Garboni ; Sunday, 14 October 2007

http://balochwriters.blogspot.com/2007/10/available-options-for-iran-walid.html

Iranian Islamic Regime is currently at an awkward position and facing threats from many fronts, democracy seeking Persian opposition groups, groups within seeking more freedom, federalists from minority nationalities seeking a federal Iran and worse of all liberation seeking Arabs, Azaris, Kurds, Lor, Turkeman and Baloch.

The US -on top of everything else- is spending 75 million dollars on Iranian descendent groups some of whom are working to raise people of Terhran for a velvet revolution. Many of the velvet revolution activists have been arrested and confessed to their evil intentions.

However, main Persian opposition groups are viewing federalists and liberation seekers a big threat to Iran's sovereignty, which –they believe- are acting on a foreign conspiracy against Iran and will indeed end up in dismantling of artificially held Iran. Despite the opposition in principle, these groups openly or behind the scene are conllaborating with current Islamic regime to have a united front against minority nations and their supporting lobbyists from international community.

New world order and situations around Iran make people believe that the fears of Persian majority Iran are legitimate where dismantlement of their country is concern. The reasons are visible determination of the world powers to undo their past mistakes and apply changes in the Middle East and south-central Asia for lasting peace. Top of lists of this plan is creating the Kurdistan and South Azerbaijan States. These creations will reduce Iran's population and territory by around 40% and Baloch, Ahwazis and other minorities will still be giving a bleeding nose to Iran.

Once Kurds have parted away remaining Iraqi division between Shiites and Sunnis, and Iranian influence of the Shiite state of Iraq will weaken Ahwazi struggle for liberation. Furthermore, Iran will use all the force at her disposal to save the oil rich territories. Therefore, the Ahwazi struggle might go under grounds for a long while.

After loosing Kurdestan South Azarbaijan and have suppressed Ahwazis Iran will be left with Baloch and two options; one to continue heavy handling of legitimate Baloch struggle and end up disappearing from face of the earth, or two to reason with Baloch and come to an agreement with them.

Iran will get more from reasoning with Baloch for many reasons. At a time when Persians are trying to extend a hand of economical, cultural and political communication and cooperation with their Persian speaking brethrens in Afghanistan and Tajikistan; access to Sea of Makkoran is the only card on negotiating table for lasting understandings between them. This can only be guaranteed when Baloch say so and Iran will have no option but to accept Baloch terms.

Baloch majority being under Pakistani occupation and fighting an effective war for the liberation of their motherland will sooner or later remove Pakistani occupation and the world is ready to welcome Republic of Balochistan by their side. After liberation of the Eastern Balochistan, Baloch will continue fighting for the liberation of other parts of their motherland. But Iran's reasoning with the Baloch government could end the hostility and lead to the creation of a union or a confederation of five states namely Great Balochistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. END
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Beyond the Wall: Sources of Iran’s Terror Campaign in Balochistan

Paper no. 2414 ; http://www.saag.org/papers25/paper2414.html

Guest Column by Belaar Baloch ; 16-Oct-2007

The decades-old and artificial division of Balochistan between Iran and Pakistan is bringing yet new grief to its population. Amid speculation that the United States may take coercive measures to forestall Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, the regime in Tehran is heavily fortifying its border regions, especially its “vulnerable” southeastern frontier known as Sistan-va-Balochistan, where it connects with Pakistani-controlled eastern Balochistan, its other half. While the international community is focused upon the most pressing issues, i.e., the war on terror and the boiling crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities, the voice of the Baloch people—repressed by both Iran and Pakistan—is either unheard or, for political reasons, deliberately ignored.

Unlike other ethno-national groups that fell victim to the decolonization process, Baloch miseries began early, when rival imperial forces confronted each other in a long game of geopolitics. This game ultimately cost the Baloch people their sovereign statehood and resulted in the arbitrary division of their homeland. Those who are familiar with the history of the “Great Game” will know how imperial Britain appeased Iran by serving up the western part of Balochistan in an effort to stem the feared Russian advance towards the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Locked in its intense geopolitical rivalry with Russia, Britain had left untouched the semi-sovereign status of the eastern part of Balochistan, hoping eastern Balochistan would serve as a buffer to help preserve its richest colony, India. In the aftermath of the First World War, a confident British foreign secretary Lord Curzon, then assuming the control of Iraq as a protectorate under the League’s mandate, and realising the great importance of this region, summed up the Imperial forward strategy in this way:

“Now, that we are about to assume the mandate for Mesopotamia, which will make us conterminous with the western frontiers of Asia, we cannot permit the existence between the frontiers of our Indian Empire and Balochistan and those of our new protectorate, a hotbed of misrule, enemy intrigue, financial chaos and political disorder. Further, if Persia were to be alone, there is every reason to fear that she would be overrun by Bolshevik influence from the north. Lastly, we possess in the south-western corner of Persia great assets in the shape of oil fields, which are worked for the British navy and which give us a commanding interest in that part of the world.”

With partition of the subcontinent in 1947, however, Britain colluded with the founders of the newly created state of Pakistan to force eastern Balochistan to join Pakistan.

The Baloch living in these forcibly annexed territories, however, never accepted the new status quo. From the outset, the Baloch perceived this division and arbitrary rule of their homeland by the Persians and Punjabis as illegitimate. The Baloch refused to abandon their socio-cultural identity and adopt the alien values imposed by the Persians. Despite the creation of the unnatural border known as the Goldsmith Line, the Baloch from both sides not only maintained their socio-cultural ties, but even strengthened these links in order to counter the threats of assimilation they felt emanate from both Pakistan and Iran.

Iran’s recent decision to physically separate Balochistan with a hundreds of kilometre-long wall, turning it into two non-communicating halves, is an extraordinary affirmation of state power and one that reflects Iran’s general readiness to aggressively control the Baloch population. In justifying this move, Iran uses border infiltrations as a pretext.

From the Qajars to the Pahlavis and, in recent times, under its revolutionary idealogues, Persians have claimed jurisdiction over ethnic minorities on the basis of their racial “supremacy” and the “higher” values of their civilisation. These xenophobic attitudes towards ethnic minorities have a long history. In the heyday of his rule, Reza Shah who was desperately seeking an ideology to unite the “nation” chose fascism. Describing Shah’s fascination with fascist ideology, Stephen Kinzer notes in his book “All The Shah’s Men” that Mussolini, Franco and Hitler “seemed to him to be embarked on the same path he had chosen, purifying and uniting weak, undisciplined nations. He launched an oppressive campaign to obliterate the identity of minority groups, especially Kurds and Azeris and glorify his ideas and person.”

Unfortunately, this history of terror against minority populations does not end with Reza Shah. His son Muhammad Reza Shah chose to reinforce his father’s mission by giving a free hand to SAVAK, one of the most dreaded intelligence organizations of its time. SAVAK’s death squads conducted numerous overt and covert operations in Balochistan, driving ordinary people out of settled areas. Eventually facing a revolt by the Baloch, Iran became the first country to establish formal diplomatic ties with Pakistan in order to legitimize the Goldsmith Line—the border dividing Baloch territory into Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The Baloch members of the West Pakistan Assembly, however, did not recognize the conclusion of the boundary commission and challenged its recommendations in Pakistan’s apex court. Fears related to the integrity of the Iranian borders led Muhammad Reza to send a large contingent of Iranian forces armed with Huey Cobra attack helicopters to support the Pakistani army in its efforts to crush the Baloch insurgency in 1973 in eastern Balochistan.

In the aftermath of its recent revolution, the theocratic regime in Tehran became even more aggressive, particularly against its non-Shi’ite minorities. Soon after consolidating their grip on power, the revolutionary zealots embarked on a plan to accomplish “Imam’s” mission: “purifying” and “enlightening” the Sunni Baloch population. The revolutionary utopians were in search of an enemy and revenge. Just as Khomeini and his lieutenants found an external enemy, i.e., the United States—the most formidable “enemy” of Islam and its revolution, so did they identify an internal one, depicting the Baloch as a “proxy” of Iraq, bent on the destabilization of the revolutionary state. Under the Shah, as one astute observer put it, “Iranian sense of excellence and racial pride had expressed itself in snobbery and hauteur. In Khomeini’s crusade, and in the magnificent isolation of its embattled position, Iran evoked—and Khomeini has insisted on this—the solitude of the Prophet Mohammad’s mission donned a religious guise.” Nevertheless, the ideals of a modern-day Mahdi had serious limits; his appeal did not extend beyond the Persian realm as non-Shi’ite minorities rejected his design to establish a more “authentic” and “pure” social order based on the repressive Shi’ite sectarian doctrine invented by Khomeini and his faithful ideologues. Since then, Tehran has perceived the Baloch as a threat to its national security and has employed various methods—from state-led terror to the policy of assimilation—to counter this perceived threat.

At present, the Baloch are suffering a “second revolution.” Under the leadership of Khomeini’s faithful followers, there are those who vow to take the revolution back to its roots. This new generation of followers has recently renewed their hostility towards the Baloch and other ethnic groups, particularly those concentrated in bordering regions. This time Shi’ite totalitarian ideology is not the sole source of adventurism, but also a recently revived Persian nationalism. These two aggressive impulses derive from the regime’s increasing paranoia: that Baloch political groups are being “aided” by western states in order to create internal instability.

In search of the “enemy within,” the new revolutionaries, under the banner of Shi’ite authenticity and Persian nationalism, have reinforced their terror campaign in the towns and villages across the Baloch region. After a long and unsuccessful campaign to indoctrinate ordinary Baloch into Shi’itism, the regime recently revived old terror tactics used to intimidate innocent civilians. During the shah’s despotic rule, SAVAK’s clandestine agents ruled Baloch streets; under Khamenai, the task was given to the thugs of Marsad (Ambush). But methods and tactics remain the same and these include: systematic use of violence to eliminate political activists, extrajudicial killing of Baloch political activists and religious clerics, forced eviction of ordinary people, the destruction of houses and agricultural farms, thereby creating a general climate of fear in order to force the Sunni Baloch into submission.

With its failed attempt to garner support from the non-Persian population for its nuclear quest, the regime has also employed violent means to silence those who are unwilling to share in its euphoria over its nuclear program. Following a chilling defeat at the hands of the Baloch resistance fighters in the heart of Zahedan city, the elite Revolutionary Guards Corps turned their guns on innocent civilians and conducted barbaric public executions. In so doing, the Persian leadership proved to the world that even in this modern age, they are not ashamed to carry out the medieval and ruthless purges characteristic of their past.

Nevertheless, when it comes to the subject of moral stature, the Persian leadership never forgoes an opportunity to teach Persian “moral” values to the world. On the eve of releasing the British sailors the President of Iran, addressing a large media audience, seized this opportunity to deliver a lecture to a western audience, trying to claim the moral high ground. In his hypocritical speech, he demonised the western system, depicting it as unfair and unjust, especially with regards to women’s rights, notwithstanding the fact that the Islamic Republic is the only state in the world that permits the execution of children, most recently the barbaric hanging of Said Qmabarzai, a seventeen-year old teenager.

For the Baloch, Kurds, Awazis, Turkomen and Azeris, the sky will not fall when U.S. cruise missiles overwhelm Iranian nuclear sites, because the subjugated minorities do not share the agenda of the Persians: to make this state a regional hegemon. For generations, these minorities have been denied their basic rights under Persian rule. And the Baloch, with a distinctive history and character, were never, after all, a part of “Greater Persia.” Nor will they benefit if they choose to become a component of this Persian megalomaniac state. Similarly, the Baloch in Pakistan have no incentive to embrace a Punjabi regime that has converted Baloch eastern territory into a nuclear dumping ground: its hills are still covered with radioactive dust and its soil contaminated.

Now obsessed with Iran’s nuclear program, the West has failed to condemn the regime over its human rights abuses against the Baloch and other ethnic minorities. The strategic considerations of the West take priority over human suffering. It is true that the notion of justice has never been a popular feature in the realm of international politics, especially in that part of the world where hydrocarbon politics is central to the shrewd practitioners of realpolitik, who in their very tradition, are willing to overlook human suffering at the cost of “stability” and “order.” However, the obsession to preserve this order at the expense of human catastrophe has blinded policymakers to the fact that it is this very international order that is threatened by both Pakistan and Iran.

The former is armed with nuclear weapons and employs jihadi groups as a foreign policy tool in its efforts to gain strategic depth. It regards Afghanistan as part of its strategy to gain an economic foothold in the Central Asian republics. The later is vigorously meddling in an unstable Iraq, as well as pursuing the development of nuclear arsenals to dominate the region. Imagine a world with these two rogue states, both armed with nuclear weapons, and their foreign policies driven by militant Shi’ite and Wahabi ideologies.

Ironically, Washington has rediscovered its “reliable” ally in the war on terror. The nature of its “cooperation” with the Punjabi military regime provides the answer as to why the West is overlooking Pakistan’s policy of repression in eastern Balochistan. While America pours billions of dollars into Pakistan to appease its army, the whole region has been transformed into a military garrison, one in which the local Baloch have been driven out of their towns and villages and compelled to live as refugees on their own soil. America’s policy has brought neither stability to Afghanistan , nor has it helped dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.

Facing state-led ethnic cleansing by both Iran and Pakistan, the Baloch demand protection from the international society. While moral rhetoric in the foreign policy of civilized nations rarely overrides strategic interest, in this case, it is in their own interest to save the secular and tolerant Baloch, who are at present besieged in a heartland of extremists and fanatics.

(The writer is a Baloch academic living abroad. He is working in areas related to strategic and security issues. His E-mail address is: belaar3@yahoo.com)