As Pakistan celebrates its 60th anniversary of independence from British colonial rule, the people of Baluchistan mourn the crushing of their free and independent nation by what they see as "Pakistani imperialism".

On August 11 1947, the British protectorate of Baluchistan declared its independence. Three days later, Pakistan also became an independent nation. But the two states coexisted for less than a year.

In March 1948, Pakistan invaded and seized Baluchistan. Under threat of imprisonment, the traditional Baluch leader, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, was pressured to sign a treaty of integration. This treaty was, however, never agreed by the Baluchistan parliament and never mandated by the Baluch people.

Ever since, for six decades, Baluchistan has been subjected to Pakistani military occupation, political domination, economic exploitation and cultural hegemony. Pakistan is an oppressed nation turned oppressor nation. It now adopts the imperialist tactics of its former colonial overlords to subjugate and exploit the Baluch.

Baluchistan makes up the whole south-west of Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan and Iran in the west and the Arabian Sea in the south. It accounts for nearly half of Pakistan's land mass and is immensely rich in natural resources, including oil, gas, coal, copper and gold. Despite this huge mineral wealth, Baluchistan is one of the poorest regions of Pakistan. Much of the population is malnourished, illiterate and semi-destitute, living in squalid housing with no electricity or clean drinking water.

Faced with Baluch resistance to annexation and occupation, the Pakistan armed forces have often resorted to extreme brutality, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In December 2005, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Baluchistan's former chief minister, reported that Pakistani troops had used chemical weapons against Baluch tribespeople. He produced photographs of individuals bleeding from their mouths and noses, who he said were civilian victims of poison gas attacks. Other reports allege Pakistan's use of napalm and cluster bombs in civilian areas. Although such weapons violate the laws of war, Pakistan's crimes against the people of Baluchistan have, so far, escaped any serious international criticism.

Emboldened by the indifference of the UN, Pakistan has mounted indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas in a bid to crush Baluch rebellion and terrorise the population into submission.

On March 17 2005, the Pakistan military shelled the town of Dera Bugti, killing more than 70 civilians. In December that year, Islamabad launched a ruthless military operation against the Marri Baloch people, killing 86 and wounding 120. Many of the victims were women and young children.

A 2006 report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) documented arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, extra-judicial and summary executions, disappearances and the use of excessive and indiscriminate violence by Pakistan's police, military, security and intelligence forces. These findings were corroborated by Amnesty International.

Typical tortures include being hung upside-down, sleep deprivation, electric shocks and cigarette burns. Baluch torture victims talk about the abuses they suffered, here and here.

Kachkol Ali Baloch, an opposition leader in the Baluchistan assembly, has alleged there are about 4,000 people who are either missing or have been detained without trial. Those who have disappeared number around 1,000 students and political activists, including prominent nationalist leaders such as Ghulam Mohammed Baluch, president of the Baluch National Movement, and Saleem Baluch and Sher Mohammed Baluch, both leaders of the Jamhoori Watan party. The Balochvoice.com website lists over 260 people who have been abducted by the Pakistanis.

Among those jailed are Akhtar Mengal, president of Balochistan National party, who is widely believed to have been framed on terrorism charges. Other nationalist leaders are dead. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and 26 of his colleagues were killed in August 2006 by the Pakistani army in a targeted assassination plot to decapitate the nationalist leadership.

Pakistan's violent suppression has forced almost 100,000 Baluch civilians to flee their homes. They have become refugees in their own land. Pakistan ignores their plight, restricting media access and reportage and refusing to allow the UN and international aid agencies in to assist them.

To further subjugate and pacify Baluchistan, Islamabad is working on a sinister scheme to colonise the region with Punjabis (the largest and dominant ethnic group in Pakistan). The aim is to make the Baluch people a minority in their own homeland, as happened to the Native Americans in the US. This goal has already been achieved in major cities like Quetta, where colonist settlers now predominate.

Cultural imperialism is another weapon in Pakistan's bid to crush Baluchistan. Punjabi supremacists believe they have a sacred duty to "civilise" the "uncivilised" Baluch. They have imposed an alien language, Urdu, on the Baluchi-speaking people. In a similar fashion to the tactics of the apartheid regime in South Africa, which forced black children to be schooled in Afrikaans, Islamabad has dictated that Urdu is the compulsory language of instruction in Baluch educational institutions.

The cultural conquest of Baluchistan also involves the Islamification of the traditionally more secular Baluch nation. A large number of religious schools have been funded by the Pakistani state, with a view to imposing Pakistan's harsher, more narrow-minded interpretation of Islam. This is fuelling fundamentalism.

The west's attitude towards the plight of the Baluch is less than honourable. Because Britain and the US want Pakistan as an ally in the so-called war on terror, they have armed Pakistan and acquiesced with its suppression of the Baluch people.

Pakistan's war against Baluchistan is strengthening the position of the Taliban, who have exploited the unstable, strife-ridden situation to establish bases and influence in the region. From these bases, the Taliban terrorise the more liberal and secular Baluch people and seek to enforce the Talibanisation of Baluchistan. The Pakistani government mostly tolerates the Taliban, on the grounds that its presence acts as a second force to crush the Baluch people and weaken their struggle for independence.

If the foreign secretary, David Miliband, wants to strike a blow against the Taliban and Islamic fundamentalism, he should seek an end to Pakistan's repression in Baluchistan and support the Baluch people's right to self-determination.

* More information on the Baluch freedom struggle.

Read more about India and Pakistan 60 years after partition here

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Central Asia’s Seaport: Gwadar or Chabahar?

8-23-2007 ; http://www.registan.net

Both Iran and Pakistan have developed strategies to create strong economic and transport ties with Central Asia and beyond. Anchoring these strategies are two new seaports: Gwadar in Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran. Spreading out from these ports are existing or planned transportation infrastructure that leads into their respective country’s economic center and importantly for Central Asia, northwards. Both ports are well towards becoming fully operable and are offering generous incentives for companies and governments to do business in their ports. However, serious political, economic and logistical problems remain. For Central Asia one of these two ports, or indeed both, will likely become important links to world markets.   Karachi is already overburdened with severe congestion from commercial, fishing and military shipping. And from a strategic vantage point it is quite problematic. The Indian Navy targeted the port in 1971 and any blockade in the future would devastate Pakistan since that country has an overreliance on the port of Karachi. The port of Qasim, built in the 1970s was to relive some of that burden and the port of Gwadar is expected to further reduce the reliance on Karachi.
Bandar Abbas is of enormous strategic significance to Iran as it is located on the Strait of Hormuz leading into the Persian Gulf. But that is also a problem for Iran. The area is already burdened with high traffic and of course, the U.S. Navy. Iran wishes to have another port that is more conducive to trade and further growth.

The problems with Karachi and Bandar Abbas

Karachi is already overburdened with severe congestion from commercial, fishing and military shipping. And from a strategic vantage point it is quite problematic. The Indian Navy targeted the port in 1971 and any blockade in the future would devastate Pakistan since that country has an overreliance on the port of Karachi. The port of Qasim, built in the 1970s was to relive some of that burden and the port of Gwadar is expected to further reduce the reliance on Karachi.
Bandar Abbas is of enormous strategic significance to Iran as it is located on the Strait of Hormuz leading into the Persian Gulf. But that is also a problem for Iran. The area is already burdened with high traffic and of course, the U.S. Navy. Iran wishes to have another port that is more conducive to trade and further growth.

Gwadar

Gwadar, being much further away from India than Karachi, makes obvious strategic sense. But it is its commercial potential that will provide the most benefits. Gwadar is not some long-term project. Its first phase, with 75% of the costs covered by the Chinese government, is already completed. The existing docks, built by the Chinese Harbor Engineering Company, are now being operated by Port of Singapore. Port of Singapore won the contract over Dubai Ports World, the company that was forced out of America by opportunistic xenophobes in both political parties there. Phase two will be completed by 2010, adding even more capacity. Ziad Haider, a researcher at the South Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center, noted that Pakistan can make the project succeed if it maintains the financial and political support of China for the project and if it makes some concessions to the Baluchis near Gwadar, who have already carried out deadly attacks on Chinese engineers.
The problem with Gwadar, wrote Ammad Hassan in his thesis for the US Naval Postgraduate School, is that while the port has been built, “the supporting infrastructure of railroad link, industrial capacity, and civic structures at Gwadar is almost non-existent.” And of course, all analysts mention Pakistan’s extremely problematic relations with the ethnic Baluch in the area who, in addition to having been in a low-grade insurgency for some time, are not at all supportive of the port. And to understate another issue, southern Afghanistan is not quite ready to be a reliable transport corridor for Pakistan to access Central Asia, despite the Afghan government’s voiced support for the project. Nevertheless, the idea of further integrating Central Asian and Russian resources southward with the Asian and Middle Eastern market has others optimistic about the long-term prospects. The Asian Development Bank is somewhat cautious though, noting that initially the port will be significant only to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

Chabahar

Gwadar’s competition for trade and transport will come from Chabahar, the new Indian-financed port in Iran. A port outside of the Persian Gulf makes sense from a strategic and logistical viewpoint for Iran. The port of Chabahar was part of a plan to develop transportation infrastructure in Iran’s east for many years. Initially put in hold in 1984 it was revived in 2002 with Indian help. And the financing and engineering assistance from India is not limited to the port. India, wishing to bypass Pakistan, is also cooperating on a highway system that leads from the port into Afghanistan as well as a planned railroad to Afghanistan. Iranian officials state that they wish to have Bandar Abbas remain as the port for Russian and European trade and have Chabahar become the port for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran already has good relations with everybody along the route leading north (including the local “warlords”) into Tajikistan. And significantly, it is in Tajikistan where Iran has already been financing several transport projects including the Anzob tunnel. And luckily for the Iranians, the U.S. constructed a bridge over the Amu Darya that fits in nicely with the Chabahar to Khojent route.

Prospects for economic integration of Central Asia with the South

For energy and mineral resources to be sent south from Central Asia a much more expensive transport infrastructure will be required than what is being built at the moment. Another limitation is the lack of a business friendly environment in most Central Asian states. And consumer goods are already entering Central Asia from Russia and China. What more is there a demand for? Furthermore, many Central Asian leaders are obsessed over local issues and haven’t been overly enthusiastic about regional integration (with Uzbekistan being the worst offender).
What is a long-term prospect is Central Asia being a transport route from the ports to Xinjiang, Russia and Kazakhstan, all of them important markets. The routes to Gwadar and Chabahar cut off thousands of kilometers for certain trade routes.

Strategic considerations

Any transportation or military problems in the Straits of Malacca, the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez or anywhere along Asia’s southern coastline will further boost the importance of Central Asia as a transport and trade corridor. Beyond Pakistan and Iran, both China and India are seeking closer relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia. The planned transport and trade routes will have the obvious effect of building solid ties. Iran’s considerations are boosting trade, having secure borders, and avoiding “encirclement” by American proxies (no matter how much a figment of the Iranian government’s imagination). As for Pakistan, the governments there has hoped for better relations with Central Asia. However, their Afghanistan policy always got in the way. Now they hope to move away from that era.

Conclusion

The countries of Central Asia will likely benefit from both Chabahar and Gwadar. Diversifying its import and export routes is a logical economic and political step. Although one should not exaggerate the economic benefits to be reaped. As for the competition between the two ports, it will not be a “winner take all” outcome but rather one port earning the greater share of trade. And the “winner” in this respect will likely be Chabahar, at least in the short term. Iran is more stable than Pakistan, it has better relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, and unlike the Gwadar route its proposed route goes through relatively stable parts of Afghanistan. As long as Iran avoids outright conflict with the United States or any sort of domestic turmoil it should come out of this competition with an advantage.

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Gwader and Chabahar, shall fail

By Khan Jan Baloch ; 8-23-2007 ; http://www.saag.org

Both Gwader Port and Chabahar, shall fail if these routes harm the political and economical interests of the locals. In the long run, the hungry and deprived human beings in this part of the world, shall be turned to be wolves to feed their kids. These routes, business silky ways, shall benefit only the oppressive nations of both Iran and Pakistan i.e. Panjabes and Persians and not the poors like Balochs, Kurds, Pashtuns and others.

For a successful business route from Chabahar, connecting the Central Asian countries including Russian Federation and China, we must look back in the history. The gate-way to these land-locked countries is ......Balochistan. For the last many centuries in our history, Balochistan guaranted the safe movements of Carvans after paying the local taxes called: "Showrr". The denial to pay the tax....Showr, resulted into violent attacks on such "business-carvans" which are called "robbery" in the present civilised language.

The Gate-way to the land-locked countries of Central Asia is Balochistan which must be freed. "An Independent Sistan va Balochistan with a 80 KM bread corridor of Eastern Khorasan", alongwith western border of Afghanistan, shall connect Chabahar port to Turkmenistan.

Chabahar-port shall connect Afghanistan and Central Asian countries via free-state of "Sistan va Balochistan with the corridor" by rail and road routes.

Through Independent "Sistan va Balochistan" the pipe-lines of Hydrocarbone from Central Asian countries and Turkmenistan can be laid by paying cheap tax---Showrr. Thus, through Chabahar-port, European Union and India, shall be able to get their energy necessities cheaper as compared with the proposed pipe-lines through Turkey and Russia.

The learned civilised elements of the "Globalisation Machine" must learn some-thing from the past history, the environment of the land and economical necessities of the local population must be taken in account. The loud drums for the success of Gwader-Port or Chabahar-port must be accepted and connected with the "Independent Balochistan" ... a guarantee for peace and prosperity and success of such projects.

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Lunch with Komala
 

By JAMES MARTIN, THE JERUSALEM POST; Aug 23, 2007

Any proper visit to Iraq should include a call on one of the many armed guerrilla groups that inhabit the mountainous Kurdish region in the north. With the right contacts and a sturdy car, you can meet with members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) - a terrorist organization that has been at war with Turkey for 23 years - in their de-facto autonomous region high in the Kandil Mountains. Granted, a trip to their camps might be interrupted by the occasional shelling from Turkey or Iran, or an unpleasant encounter with an uppity young guerrilla at a checkpoint.

Alternatively, one phone call and a 10-minute drive from the city of Suleimaniya can get you a lunch date with a group of revolutionaries dedicated to the overthrow of the Iranian state. And while the PKK only offers its guests flat Coca-Cola in small glasses, these guys will give you a full meal.

A colleague and I recently decided to begin a tour of the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan with a visit to Komala. It is a small guerrilla outfit - roughly 800 strong - made up exclusively of Iranian Kurds who have fled the Kurdish regions of western Iran into Iraq. The group has been operating out of the foothills of the Karadagh Mountains, 50 kilometers from the border with Iran, since it was forced out of the country in the bloody aftermath of the 1979 revolution.

Eager to gain a glimpse into the complex world of domestic Iranian politics and opposition movements - a world that is almost impenetrable to the Western observer - we scheduled an interview with Komala's leader Abdullah Mohtadi and were escorted up to the group's hideout early one Wednesday morning.

We found the camp at the end of a dusty mountain road, where soldiers in green fatigues carrying Kalashnikovs - a sight I was well accustomed to after only a few days in Iraq - stopped our car and asked our driver what we were doing there. To my amazement, a female guerrilla stood guard at the camp's gate, over which the Kurdish flag and the flag of Komala - a red, Soviet-esque strip of cloth with a large star in the middle - flew together. She too was equipped with an AK-47 and wore the normal military fatigues, without any hijab covering her hair and neck. Only later would I learn that several of the secular guerrilla groups in the region, including the PKK, employ female fighters.

As we got out of the car, the soldiers shuffled us into an office adorned with posters of Che Guevara and long-dead Iranian revolutionaries. They searched our bags for weapons and bombs, all the while apologizing for the inconvenience and promising we could take pictures once inside. As I would quickly learn, Komala - one of the few Iranian dissident groups to which journalists have access - is desperate for greater attention and support in the West, and its leaders go out of their way to accommodate the rare few who decide to come and listen to their story. Accordingly, the guards treated us gently and quickly sent us on our way to Mohtadi's office, where we were greeted with great hospitality. Tea was instantly served and a large bowl of fruit was passed around the room.

The office was strikingly sophisticated. Instead of machine guns and rockets, its only advanced technology was a modern, flat-screen computer monitor. The bookshelves were stacked with memoirs by American statesmen and books by popular journalists. In between volumes in Kurdish and Farsi, an enormous Oxford English Dictionary stuck awkwardly out into the room.

Mohtadi, who sat with co-revolutionary Muhammad Shafei, spoke English with a perfect British accent. Having spent many years in the UK, he had acquired the air of an intellectual-cum-rebel: a well-educated and cultured man who had traded a comfortable life in the West for armed struggle against the Iranian state. Although himself a Kurd, Mohtadi insisted that his battle was not simply for Kurdish rights or autonomy within Iran; instead, Komala is dedicated to the complete overthrow of the religious regime in Teheran and its replacement with a democratic government that respects the rights of all of the country's many minority groups. This end has remained the same since the party's founding in 1969 and motivated its early struggles against the oppressive, American-backed Shah Reza Pahlavi.

"We actively took part in the Iranian revolution," Mohtadi told us. "There were no social or political freedoms [under the shah]. We had economic development, but no political development."

Komala was one of several secular, leftist revolutionary groups that helped overthrow the shah, but its prominence was quickly overshadowed by the popularity of the rising Ayatollah Khomeini. And as the direction the revolution would take became clear, Mohtadi told us, the political differences between Komala and the ascendant Islamist parties became too great to ignore.

"Directly after the revolution, there was a divergence between the Kurdish and the Islamist movements," he said. "We could not expect dictatorship. It was an anti-dictatorship movement. But political Islam led by Khomeini overwhelmed the whole movement."

"No one expected the revolution to be hijacked by the clergy," Shafei piped in.

"The nature of the revolution in [Iranian] Kurdistan was quite different from that in Teheran," Mohtadi continued. "In Kurdistan, the whole movement was democratic and secular. [But the clergy] could not tolerate a peninsula of democracy and political freedom in their country."

Thus, shortly after securing power in Teheran, Khomeini turned his forces on the democratic holdout in Kurdistan, eventually managing to occupy the region and to force Komala across the border into Iraq. By that time, the Iran-Iraq War had begun and Saddam Hussein was more than willing to harbor the anti-Khomeini rebels. But Komala's relationship with him was always precarious: Saddam often tried to enlist Komala in covert Iraqi operations within Iran, only to shell and bomb the group - once even with chemical weapons - when he suspected it of encouraging the separatist tendencies of Iraq's Kurdish population.

Since 1991, when Iraqi Kurdistan won limited autonomy from the Baghdad government at the conclusion of the first Gulf War, Komala has been able to operate with more freedom and security. The group is often penetrated by Iranian spies and assassins, however, one of whom was caught trying to poison its leadership.

BUT KOMALA is not without its own agents in Iran, we were told. More than 95 percent of the group's activities take place across the border, they pointed out, and agents are constantly mobilizing the Kurdish population to resist the regime. "We are organizing people in Iran and we are doing it around the clock," Mohtadi said. "What you see here is only the tip of the iceberg."   Komala's activities are now mostly organizational: mobilizing Iran's Kurdish population against or in favor of a certain measure or candidate, encouraging a low voter turnout in general elections or calling for demonstrations or a general strike. The group also prints a newspaper and has TV and radio transmitters from which subversive programs, in both Kurdish and Farsi, are broadcast into Iran.

Komala's leaders last tasted the fruits of their labor in a 2005 uprising in Iranian Kurdistan. The rebellion was instigated by the brutal torture and murder by Iranian agents of Shivan Qaderi, a Kurdish opposition member, and erupted into clashes between Iranian forces and the population of the predominantly Kurdish city of Mahabad. Mohtadi's group quickly seized the opportunity and helped spread the unrest throughout the region.

"Nearly a month [the uprising] continued," Mohtadi said. "It spread all over Kurdistan. There were demonstrations and protests."

"It became so large we didn't know how to cope with it," Shafei added.

Mohtadi quickly realized, however, that the uprising was not widespread enough, nor was Komala strong enough, to bring down the regime. And he became increasingly worried that continued revolt would bring brutal reprisals against the Kurds. So Mohtadi ordered the rebellion to culminate in a general strike, after which it would end.

The uprising was not a complete failure, he and Shafei told us - it helped unify Kurds throughout Iran against the regime - but ultimately it fell short of Komala's revolutionary goals. Witnessing its only partial success, it became clear to Mohtadi that his group could not by itself bring revolution to Teheran.

"It is not possible to topple the regime by the Kurds alone," he said. "[But] the Kurdish movement can be a vital part in building coalitions in Iran. It can be a catalyst to a broad democratic front."

In Iran, he pointed out, there are "six main nationalities, all with their own culture, land and history. That's why we advocate a democratic, federal system in Iran. We have friendly relations with different nationalities in Iran and are building an umbrella front - the Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran."

KOMALA'S PUSH for greater cooperation between different ethnic groups seems surprising for a guerrilla group that is composed exclusively of one ethnicity itself. But while its leadership may be ecumenical in its worldview, the Komala guerrillas we spoke to at the camp saw their struggle against the mullahs through a distinctly Kurdish lens.

When we asked Amjad Hussein, a young insurgent with whom we shared a spartan lunch of chicken and rice that afternoon, why he crossed the border to join the group, he told us, "Because Kurds are considered second-class citizens. It's a tragic life to live in Iran and to deal with this regime. Being a Kurd is reason enough for them to abuse you. We heard about Komala from our parents and relatives, and when we grew up, we had to choose how to live. I chose to join the peshmerga."

Hussein tellingly used the traditional Kurdish word for armed warrior, which translated literally into English means "one who faces death," to describe the Komala guerrillas. And while he could rattle off the group's party line on its official political ends - bringing back political freedom and democracy to all Iranians - he clearly saw his battle as one for the rights of his own people.

His body bore the marks of his convictions. Tattooed across his right hand was "Long live Kurdistan!" in Arabic letters, the script used by the dialect of Kurdish spoken in Iran. If caught by Iranian authorities with his tattoo, he told us, his hand would be burned until all traces of the ink were removed.

Yet even in its most stridently nationalistic moments, Komala makes no claim to being a pan-Kurdish movement. Unlike the PKK - whose activities have been primarily directed against Turkey but who now support a sister organization, Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), operating inside Iran - Komala does not fight for worldwide Kurdish liberation.

"The Kurds are a nation but are separated into different countries," Mohtadi told us. "We support the Kurdish people in Turkey, but we think there is no need for a war. It is better for the Kurds to take their place in the political process in Turkey."

He reserved particular ire for the PKK, whom he saw as involving itself where it did not belong in the affairs of Komala's Iranian Kurdish constituency. "We will have no coordination with [the PKK], unless they commit themselves to the principle that they should not interfere with the affairs of the Iranian Kurds," he said. "We are a different culture in a different situation. Every part of Kurdistan should have the right to run [its] own affairs."

Furthermore, Mohtadi continued, Komala and the PKK do not share the same philosophy of resistance. Unlike the PKK, which has been responsible for numerous suicide bombings, kidnappings and assassinations over the years, Mohtadi's group completely rejects terrorism. Indeed, despite training in the use of AK-47s, RPGs and anti-aircraft guns, Mohtadi claims that Komala is not now engaged in any violent conflict with the Iranian state.

"The time is not yet ripe for widespread peshmerga operations," he said. "We want to give political activities and mass movements a chance. We think military operations could be counterproductive."

"It gives them an excuse to sanction Kurdistan," Shafei added.

But how could their non-violent measures against a brutal theocracy lead to anything more than a limited uprising like that of 2005? Mohtadi was adamant: His tactics would work and the regime would fall if the opposition could work better together.

The Iranian regime, he said, is "not that strong. It benefits from the weakness of the opposition because it is not united and strong enough." This weakness could be compensated for, Mohtadi added, through the support of Western countries that are at odds with the Iranian regime. On a recent trip to the US to speak with State Department officials, he made a case for increased American support for the opposition, but received in return only vague expressions of sympathy.

With his list of grievances against the Iranian regime, which includes many points in common with that of the Bush administration - its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for Hizbullah and Hamas and refusal to recognize Israel - Mohtadi's group would be a logical destination for several million dollars of US funds earmarked in 2006 to support democracy promotion in Iran. But so far, his pleas seem to have fallen on deaf ears.

"The question is, while the international community is suffering from this regime," he said, "it is very inactive and indifferent to what goes on among the opposition groups. I would ask the whole international community to support students, workers, women and the people. Morally, politically, materially."

He did point out, however, that UN-backed sanctions against Iran were beginning to take effect, and Shafei described with thinly-concealed glee the chaos that had broken out across Iran the night before when a gasoline-rationing law went into effect. On this front, Mohtadi had a very clear prescription for the international community: "Stop every single economic support of the Iranian regime."

We pressed Mohtadi for his opinion on a possible US military strike against Iran. While the official stance of Komala is firmly opposed to the idea, Mohtadi was unsure what the effect of a US attack would be. He admitted that it could conceivably help incite revolution, but that there were better - and safer - ways to do so.

"If people realize that the government is weak enough - by whatever means: a US attack, the impact of economic sanctions, a general strike - they will rise. I deeply believe this."

When would that be? "Nobody knows," Mohtadi said, "I hope it's not too long."

Until that moment, however, Komala will bide its time in the safety of its Iraqi home away from home, printing newspapers, training peshmerga and entertaining the occasional Western guest. Even after nearly 25 years of waiting, the revolutionary fervor of its leaders has not waned.

But if you do decide to visit their tiny mountain village of Zirgwezala - whose name in Kurdish, Mohtadi told me, means "little wild walnut tree" - you should probably do it soon. Mohtadi did not expect his group to be waiting forever.

"Everybody senses change in Iran and everybody is waiting for this change," he told us with passion as we finished our tea and readied to leave. "Millions are ready."

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Remembering Nawab Bugti

BY Dr. Naseer Dashti ; Baloch

In the history of nations, many personalities are remembered as legends, heroes or villains according to the perception of the people towards their actions and performances. In the tortuous history of the Baloch existence, there are names which are revered by the Baloch as heroes which became legendary personalities and are depicted in the Baloch literature and folklore like Greek mythological entities. August twenty-six 2006 witnessed the birth of another hero, when Nawab Akbar Bugti and his companions entered the stage of the Baloch history as heroes and legendary figures by sacrificing their present in order to secure a bright future of the Baloch. They were the victims of one of the most vicious and tragic crimes ever perpetrated against the Baloch national leaders by adversaries in the long and painful conflict of this nation with the dominating forces. He will be remembered as a hero who fought for national cause and in this way wrote a new glorious page in the history of the Baloch national resistance. The manner he preserved the Baloch traditional values while alive and the manner he fought against the tremendous odds and the manner he was murdered made him one of the legendary figures of the Baloch national history. Nawab Bugti will be remembered as one of the most famous, one of the most admired, one of the most beloved, and, without any doubt, the most extraordinary of the Baloch national leaders who walked to his eminent death with dignity and honour.

One may wonder why a person would be remembered as a hero and legendary figure that had been demonized by the powerful state apparatus as a brutal tribal chief. A person who was depicted by state propaganda machinery and its allies among the Baloch as acting only for the fulfilment of his personal interests. Understandably, the demonizing efforts of the state establishment were without any influence on the Baloch regarding Nawab Bugti and towards other national leaders for many reasons. Firstly, because it is in the knowledge of every Baloch that from the very beginning of the annexation of Kalat into Pakistan, the whole state machinery and lackeys of state establishment among the Baloch tried their best and still trying to demonize the Baloch national leadership especially the three leading personalities including Nawab Bugti. Secondly, the state propaganda became ineffective regarding Baloch leadership because the Baloch masses are aware that it has been the policy of aggressors to demonize them before the Baloch leadership could be physically annihilated. In this perspective, the cruel murder of Nawab Bugti has been interpreted by the Baloch as reflecting the attitudes, behaviours and designs of the aggressive forces towards the Baloch with the ultimate aim of total domination of the Baloch land and natural resources. It has been interpreted by the Baloch to reflect the designs of the aggressors to the total destruction of the Baloch culture, identity, and history. The Baloch will remember Nawab Bugti because they know he was determined to fight for the preservation of Baloch culture, traditions, and natural identity. They will remember him because they knew that he was inspired with genuine national and patriotic aims and sentiments.

The Baloch will remember him because they know that his personal and political life, his experience as a Baloch national leader, his ability as a veteran tribal chief, his exemplary role as a soldier and commander at the same time was very valuable for the Baloch national struggle and for the preservation of the Baloch dignity, honour and cultural identity. The Baloch will remember Nawab Bugti because they believe that his faith in Baloch destiny, his faith in the idea of national emancipation and his faith in setting the example by embracing death in the battlefield was extraordinary and genuine.

The Baloch will remember Nawab Bugti because they admire what he did and what he was doing, that fact in itself of facing alone with a handful of men an overwhelming number of enemy forces in itself is an extraordinary feat. It is among one of the few events in the Baloch history in which a leader or commander with such a small number of men had embarked on a struggle against such considerable forces. It is proof of his self-confidence and the confidence in the righteousness of his cause. The Baloch will remember Nawab Bugti because they are able to appreciate all the value of his example and because the Baloch have the most absolute conviction that his sacrifice will serve as inspiration for the people in general, and for the present and future Baloch leadership in particular.

The Baloch will remember Nawab Bugti because it was humiliating for the entire nation in which his murder was publicized by his murderers. It was humiliating for the entire Baloch nation the way his dead body was desecrated. It was humiliating for the Baloch how his murderers expressed their jubilations on the brutal murder of an 80 years old, partially paralysed Baloch chief.

The Baloch will remember him because they know that Nawab Bugti was murdered not defending any personal interest, any cause other than the cause of the exploited and oppressed Baloch. He shed his blood for the redemption of the exploited and the oppressed.

The Baloch will remember him because the Baloch landmass has always been gracious to honour his brave children and they have demonstrated this in the past that this is an appreciative people. The Baloch will remember Nawab Bugti because they know how to pay homage to the memory of the courageous men who fall in battle; the Baloch will remember him because they know how to acknowledge those who serve it.

The Baloch will remember him because the murder of Nawab is an inspiration for the Baloch youth to work harder to build a state of mind for an unflinching desire to fight and die for the common cause of national salvation. The sacrifice of Nawab will cause the reawakening of the fact that cruelties of the enemy, activities of the traitors among the Baloch and the overwhelming power of the adversary should not be considered as meaningful hindrance in a successful march towards the desired destination of national salvation. The sacrifice of Nawab has stirred the soul of the Baloch nation and, through the pain, their hearts have been opened to a profound truth – that without sacrifice the future is not bright, and that the story of all national liberation is one of a struggle against all odds. They have learned again that the Baloch national resistance was built on heroism and noble sacrifice. It was built by men who answered a call beyond duty, who gave more than was expected or required, and who gave it with little thought to worldly rewards. The Baloch nation is indeed fortunate that they are blessed with heroes like Nawab Akbar Bugti, Khan Mehrab Khan, Baloch Khan Nosherwani and countless others. They are fortunate that they can still draw on immense reservoirs of courage, character and fortitudes of such heroic leaders.

He will be remembered because he proved himself a visionary leader. He perceived the action of adversary correctly, tried to give his share in stopping the advance of the enemy, he saw the coming miseries and suffering of his people and tried to do his best to lessen the suffering of his people.

The famous Latin American revolutionary Che Guevara once said that if death surprised him at any place, it would be welcome, providing that his battle cry had reached a receptive ear and another hand was stretched out to grasp a weapon. The murder of Nawab Bugti no doubt is a hard blow for the Baloch national resistance; however, with the murder of Nawab Bugti, his battle cry has reach thousands of the Baloch ears and it will continue to reach thousands of receptive Baloch ears in the years to come. There will arise new Akbars from the rank and file of the Baloch people and they will raise their hands to take up arms in the defence of their sacred land and traditions.

It is not that the Baloch are idealizing Nawab Bugti, or enlarging in death beyond what he was in life. He will be respected and remembered because the Baloch believe that as a nationalist, as a Baloch nationalist, a real Baloch, he had infinite faith in the upholding of traditional Baloch moral values. Nawab Bugti will be remembered as a respected hero because he saw the eminent death and embraced it with grace in a typical Balochi way and gave the idea of national liberation a new and most revolutionary expression of self-sacrifice. By his extra-ordinary example, he made everlasting impact on the Baloch socio-cultural behaviours. Today, every Baloch mother will aspire in her heart that his son should follow the path of Nawab Bugti and die a death like Nawab Bugti.

The Baloch know that national liberation struggles always been long-drawn struggles. There is no quick fix in this way. There is no swift victory against the forces of dominations. The Baloch are aware of the fact that many among them are preaching in the tone of enemy that nothing can be done by a weak and helpless nation in the face of enormous power of the adversary. Nevertheless, the Baloch are also aware of the fact that many resistance movements of the oppressed nations that were very weak and small in number have flourished and been successful. They are aware of the fact that courage and belief that one is on the right side have changed the course of history. In the long drawn struggle for national emancipation, the Baloch have got an invincible influence in the death of Nawab Bugti. The noble sacrifice of Nawab Bugti strengthened the general Baloch belief that a bright future of the Baloch is not beyond the control of our generation; it has increased the general awareness among the Baloch that the time has thrust upon this generation of the Baloch a greater burden of responsibility than any generation that has ever lived.

The Baloch will remember him because they believe that Nawab and his companions did not die in vain. They believe that the blood of Nawab and his companions may well serve as a redemptive force that will bring new light to the darkness presently engulfing the Baloch horizons. The blood of Nawab Bugti will certainly nourish the tree of the Baloch aspirations.

The Baloch will never forget Nawab Bugti. The Baloch will remember him as an immortal national hero and a great patriot. The Baloch will remember him because every Baloch share with Nawab Bugti a bond of common faith in the achievement of the common goal, the common goal of emancipation, the common goal of freedom from subjugation, the common goal of living a dignified life according to their own traditions and social values. The Baloch will remember Nawab Bugti because they believe that he sacrificed his present for the bright future of the Baloch nation. The pain of his brutal murder will be deep and enduring for every Baloch. Every Baloch for generations to come will remember Nawab Bugti and his brave companions, and will cherish each of their stories - stories of bravery, stories of dedication and stories of true heroism. The 26th of august will not be remembered as a good day of the year for the Baloch; however, the Baloch will remember the day for the generations to come, on that day the Baloch will remember the towering figure of their national history who was murdered ruthlessly. On that day, the Baloch will remember how their gallant hero walked towards a dignified death. On that day, every year, the bright sun on the horizons of Balochistan will shine on the memories of Nawab Bugti’s heroic death.
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Tehran's lobbying enterprise in the United States

By Hassan Daioleslam ; 22-08-2007

Creation of NIAC (The National Iranian-American Council)

NIAC was founded thanks to the efforts of four non Iranian-Americans: Roy Coffee, Dave DiStefano, Rep. Bob Ney, and Trita Parsi. Coffee and DiStefano, both Washington lobbyists, were investigated by the Justice Department for arranging a trip to London for Bob Ney, where he met a Syrian arms dealer and convicted felon involved in a conspiracy to circumvent sanctions to sell US-made aircraft parts to Tehran .

Roy Coffee sent a letter to the Dallas Morning News in February 2006 to justify his relationship with the two London-based felons. Part of the letter discussed the founding of NIAC:

"Back in the spring or summer of 2002, a good friend of mine from law school, Darius Baghai, had just returned from visiting relatives in Iran for the first time since his family left before the revolution. He spoke with me about how the economy of Iran was humming …….From this, I took Darius in to visit with Mr. Ney. What was to be a 15 minute meeting became a 1 1/2 hour meeting as they spoke passionately about their hopes for the Iranian people. They also spoke in Farsi a great deal - I'm sure talking smack about me. From that meeting, Darius, Dave and I began to work with Trita Parsi, another Iranian-American to try to form a political action committee of Iranian-Americans to pursue a strategy of normalization of relations between the two countries…. The 4 of us worked very hard for about 9 months to form this committee."

At the time, Trita Parsi was a Swedish-Iranian graduate student in his early twenties, best known for ties to Iran 's ambassador in Sweden . A successful self-promoter, he soon attached himself as a part-time aide to Congressman Ney before he was appointed president of NIAC.

The New Lobby

NIAC's predecessor, the American-Iranian Council (AIC), was established in the 1990s with backing from multinational oil companies. For many years, it spear-headed pro-Tehran lobbying effort in the US .

AIC president Houshang Amirahmadi had been an active pro-Tehran player since early 1980s. While residing in US, he was also a presidential candidate in Iran 's elections, and officially collaborated with different Iranian institutions and notably the foreign ministry. In 1999 and 2000 Trita Parsi was helping Amirahmadi to organize lobbying events in Washington .

In 2001, the pro-Iran lobby in the United States became intensely active to prevent the renewal of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), and to lift U.S. sanctions on Iran . Despite extraordinary pressure from the lobby, ILSA passed overwhelmingly.

Prior to his imprisonment in March 2007, Bob Ney led Congressional efforts to defeat ILSA and initiate Tehran-friendly policies in concert with AIC. Disappointed and angered by the ILSA vote, Ney began to plan for the next battle of the war.

"The ILSA vote doesn't look very promising, but that doesn't mean the struggle should stop on this entire issue. It is a matter of education and re-education and people getting together and forming a citizen's lobby to make sure that members of Congress and their offices are educated on this issue," Ney told AIC in a June 2001 speech.

While Ney was hard at work "forming a citizen's lobby," Trita Parsi claimed that the majority of lawmakers voted against their true wills. In a tone apologetic to Tehran , he expressed his hope that the Iranian regime understood that he and his colleagues had worked hard to prevent this result:

"Hopefully, Tehran will recognize that an honest attempt was made to defeat or at least weaken the sanctions. The call for a review and Speaker Hastert's pledge to insist on Congressional action based on the review must also be interpreted by Tehran as a step in the right direction" (Iran Analysis July 2001 Peyvand Iran News)

This failure to block the renewal of ILSA in 2001 marked the start of a new era for the pro-Iran lobby in the United States. The lobbyists recognized that they must broadly reach out to Iranian-Americans.NIAC was created to put those plans in motion.

Trita Parsi was the regime's trusted man within the new network. Tehran's faith in Parsi was so profound that in 2003 when Iran decided to send a highly secret proposal for negotiations to the White House, Parsi was called on to arrange the delivery of the message through Bob Ney to Karl Rove. Parsi, moreover, was among the few chosen men (along with Mahallati , Iran 's former ambassador to UN) to present the results of a shady Tehran-friendly poll of the Iranian population which indicated the popularity of Iran 's nuclear program.

Trita Parsi and the Regime's Inner Circle

During the eight years of Rafsanjani's presidency, which ended in 1997, the Iranian regime had attempted without success to attract the Iranian Diaspora to its cause. Khatami's presidency recharged Tehran 's efforts. With the Supreme Leader's direct involvement, the High Council for Iranian Compatriots Overseas was created in 2000. The President heads the Council, and the Foreign Minister serves as its deputy director. The Ministry of Intelligence and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance collaborate to implement the decisions of the council.

The objective was to create a network of organizations to infiltrate and seemingly represent the Iranian community abroad, and promote policies favorable to the Iranian government. Tehran anticipated that this strategy would neutralize opposition activities abroad and legitimize the new lobby.

State-sanctioned Iranian newspapers started a campaign to promote Trita Parsi and NIAC. Pro-government publications outside Iran followed suit. The former head of the Iran interest in Washington, Ambassador Faramarze Fathnejad, was thrilled with the efforts of Trita Parsi and NIAC, and underlined "the importance of relation with Iranian organizations in the U.S. and specially pointed to NIAC and his young leader who is a consultant to CNN and has been very successful in his efforts." The Iran Ambassador even claimed 20,000 strong membership for NIAC (while only 150 is claimed by NIAC itself)!

But token rhetorical support would not alone turn an inexperienced graduate student and a corrupt Washington politician into a lobbying enterprise. Entities with ample financial resources and direct access to Iran 's top leaders had to enter the scene. This is where Siamak Namazi, an important figures of this new lobbying enterprise and a prominent member of the Iranian oil Mafia, enters the scene.

Trita Parsi and Namazi worked closely on developing the details of a grand plan to create an Iranian-American "Citizen's Lobby." They traveled to Iran together They organized joint conferences and meetings. In 1999, they co-authored a seminal paper, that provided the roadmap for the organization that later became NIAC. 24

Namazi, along with his sister Pari and brother Babak, control the Atieh enterprise in Iran and its three sister companies Atieh Roshan, Atieh Bahar and Atieh Associates, as well as numerous other direct and indirect partnerships, including Azar Energy, Menas companies in England , Atieh Dadeh Pardaz, FTZ Corporate services and MES Middle East Strategies.. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Baquer Namazi (their father) is the Chairman of Hamyaran, identified by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as a "resource center" in Tehran for Iranian non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Atieh claims to be a "fully private strategic consulting firm that assists companies better understand the Iranian market, develop business and stay ahead of [the] competition." People familiar with the oil industry in Iran understand the coded language, After all, rulers in every country in the Middle East use outside consultants to negotiate the discrete terms of lucrative oil contracts.

Atieh's customers include the foreign corporations who wish to do business in Iran . One Atieh Bahar customer, Norway 's Statoil, has been publicly identified as a participant in a scheme to bribe Iranian government officials by the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice. A number of high officials in the company were fired and the company had to pay tens of millions of dollars in penalties to the US and Norwegian governments for "payments to an Iranian official in 2002 and 2003 in order to induce him to use his influence to obtain the award to Statoil of a contract to develop phases 6, 7 and 8 of the Iranian South Pars gas field."

The most recent debacle of Atieh enterprise was in March 2007 when the CEO of the French oil company Total SA was charged with having bribed senior Iranian officials to secure contracts. Total is a major customer of the Namazi's Atieh enterprise.

Tehran 's trust in Namazi is further evidenced by the fact that his company provides the network and computer services for almost all Iranian banks, the Majles (parliament), and other important institutions. Namazi's groups monitor nearly all Iranian economic or political activities and have access to the country's most sensitive data. This is a clear indication of his prominent place inside the inner circle of power in Tehran .

While representing Tehran , Namazi, disguised as a scholar travels to the US to seemingly pursue academic activities . He succeeded so well that the Congressionally-funded National Endowment for Democracy awarded him a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellowship in 2005.

This link between the Iranian oil Mafia and "scholarly" pursuits in the US is hardly isolated. Three former Iranian deputy foreign ministers currently live in Boston posing as "scholars": Mohammad Mahallati who was also the Iranian ambassador to the UN in the late 1980s, Farhad Atai and, Abbas Maleki. In addition to his diplomatic past, Maleki has been one of the most important figures within the Iranian oil Mafia.

The Roadmap

In 1999, Parsi and Namazi presented a joint paper titled "Iranian-Americans: The bridge between two nations" at a conference organized by the Iranian government in Cypress . This report contains the manifesto and the roadmap for the new Iranian lobby in the US . The authors argue that "an Iranian-American lobby is needed in order to create a balance between the competing Middle Eastern lobbies. Without it, Iran-bashing may become popular in Congress again."

The "competing lobby" was AIPAC (American Israeli Public Affairs Committee). The pillars of the road map were:

· To have the appearance of a citizen's lobby
· To mimic the Jewish lobby in the US
· To impede Iranian opposition activities
· To infiltrate the US political system
· To break the taboo of working with the Iran 's cleric rulers for the Iranian Diaspora
· To improve the image of the Iran 's government abroad24.

In their report, Namazi and Parsi acknowledged that problems of organizing a pro-regime lobby within the Iranian-American community:

"This group's role has not been utilized any where close to its potential, however, for several reasons: A good portion of them were against the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran], therefore would not do anything to help."

"The point is, [Iranian Americans] were not about to form a lobby group that would benefit the establishment in Tehran , or benefit the Iranian-Americans themselves as a community, nor was it for the most part interested in forming a pressure group against the Islamic Republic."

This was also underlined by Roy Coffee, one of the NIAC's founders:

"We [NIAC's founders] found that most Iranians do not want to get involved in politics because of their experiences in Iran during and after the revolution. They have come to this country to make a better life for themselves and their children and don't want to get involved."

The lack of participation by the Iranian American community in this lobby has been overcome with a sophisticated machine of professional lobbyists and "friendly" circles who favor a rapprochement with the Iranian regime.

Tehran 's Advice: Mimic Jewish Lobby in Washington

One of the hallmarks of the new lobby was its desire to rival the "Israeli Lobby" in the United States . This aspiration led to the creation of the Iranian American Political Action Committee (IAPAC), loosely modeled after similar organizations created by AIPAC (American Israeli Public Affairs Committee). Three of IAPAC's board members came from the AIC's leadership.

In their 1999 paper, Parsi and Namazi analyzed at length the techniques used by AIPAC, and suggested that the same approach should be taken to create an Iranian lobby in Washington:

"Creating similar types of seminars and intern opportunities to Iranian-American youth may not improve Iran-US relations in the short run, but it will help integrate the Iranian-American community into the political life of America. In the long run, a strong and active Iranian- American lobby, partly established through these seminars and by the participants of these programs, may serve to ensure that the US and Iran never find themselves in violent opposition to each other again."

Trita Parsi has been reciting this comparison to the Israeli lobby since the late 1990's, about the time that the High Council was formed in Tehran . At the beginning his tone was more contentious and resembled the mullah's usual rhetoric, but more recently he has toned down his anti-Israeli remarks, at least in English.

The government-owned newspaper Aftab published an interview with Trita Parsi on December 28, 2006 that underscores Parsi's efforts on behalf of the Iranian regime..

Translation: "The conflict between Iran and the West on Iran 's nuclear file has entered a critical state. The government must now utilize all the possible resources to defend the national interest. In this, we have not paid enough attention to the potentially significant influence of the Iranian American society in moderating the extremist policies of the White House. In comparison of this untouched potential to the influence of the Jewish lobby in directing the policies of Washington in supporting Israel , we see the difference between what is and what could be."

Siamak Namazi began sounding similar themes.:

"I propose that we should start showing up to the leadership training seminars and other events organized by the American-Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC) for their youth. Not only will this create an opportunity to learn the fine skills of community organization and grassroots lobbying, but it also takes away from AIPAC's ability to spread misinformation about Iran through a deliberate campaign to further its own political agenda."

Not Lobbyists?

As Ney's criminal bribery and lobbying fiasco became more public, NIAC's president Trita Parsi began to downplay NIAC's lobbying activities. (NIAC is registered as a 501 c3, to which certain legal restrictions apply.) Furthermore, being lobbied by a former aid would have added to Ney's already complicated situation. Asked in 2005 whether his group lobbied the US Congress, Trita Parsi told an interviewer:

"Our group does not do any lobbying at all. We do not contact the Congressmen to support or oppose a bill."

Since its creation, however, NIAC has strived to penetrate the US political system in accordance with the roadmap Namazi and Parsi established in 1999. As the Washington Post reported on June 25, 2006:

"The NIAC helped persuade a dozen conservative House members to sign a letter to President Bush earlier this month calling for unconditional negotiations with Iran 's regime."

The external communications of Parsi and other NIAC leaders shed further light on NIAC's lobbying activities.

"The NIAC members have educational and experimental knowledge on the lobbying process and politics in America . "

".. we must establish connections on Capitol Hill to establish early-warning systems about proposed votes or bills that may oppose the best interests of Iranian-Americans."

Bob Ney, Roy Coffee, and Dave DiStefano arranged numerous workshops, training classes, seminars and speeches in which they themselves and others with experience prepared members and affiliates of NIAC to lobby and influence Congress. Parsi, Namazi and Ney organized public gatherings and discrete and exclusive $1,000 per plate fundraiser events. They even developed a training manual for lobbyists, a copy of which was sent to this writer by a former NIAC member.

NIAC itself admits that "In 2002, Congressman Ney benefited from letters sent by Iranian-Americans through NIAC's Legislative Action Center in support of his resolution on US-Iran relations."

Infiltrating Congress

Trita Parsi, Namazi and their backers fully intended to infiltrate the US Congress. One of the methods they boast of involves recruiting young Iranian Americans to serve as Congressional interns or pages by offering room, board and financial incentives. NIAC's website brags of success stories in this venture.

NIAC claims to have drafted the young Iranian American Press Secretary for Rep. Marcy Kaptur to help in improving the lobbying skills of NIAC members and affiliates. Similarly, an Iranian American student in the University of Minnesota received a financial scholarship in his senior year and becomes an intern in Senator Norm Coleman's (R-MN) Washington office. Another intern, a graduate of University of South Florida , was placed in Congressman Jim Davis' (D-FL) Washington , D.C. office. Expanding the operation to penetrate the US political system, NIAC has now formally implemented a paid trainee program and is actively in search for unwary Iranian American youth.

Conclusion

Since the early 1990's, Tehran has embarked on developing a sophisticated lobbying enterprise in the United States . Iran 's government has devoted significant manpower and financial resources to this cause. This lobbying enterprise consists of a complex, intermingled web of entities and organizations with significant overlap of leadership, and heavy involvement of the notoriously mafia-like inner circles of the Iranian regime. Disguised as scholars, many of the former Iranian government officials reside in the US and constitute an important piece of the lobby machine. NIAC and its major figures, such as Bob Ney and Trita Parsi are effective nodes of Tehran 's efforts to manipulate US policy toward self-serving ends.

Hassan Daioleslam is an independent researcher and writer who has worked closely with two experienced investigative reporters inside Iran to explore and expose Iran lobbying enterprise in the United States.

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The Revolt of Arab-Iranians

Amir Taheri, Arab News

Is the Islamic Republic of Iran facing a growing revolt by its Arab minority?

Until a couple of years ago, the question would have sounded naive or provocative. In the 1980s, Arab-Iranians had fought bravely against Saddam Hussein’s forces despite the fact that they were linked to the invading Iraqis by ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious ties going back 1300 years.

According to data from the Foundation for the Martyrs, an organization supposed to look after war veterans and the families of the war dead, the number of Arab-Iranians who died for the fatherland was proportionally four times higher than Iranians from other ethnic backgrounds. And, yet, in the past two years evidence has mounted that Arab-Iranians, disenchanted by the Islamic republic and angry at Tehran’s increasingly repressive policies under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are drawn toward dissidence and revolt.

Last year, rising tension in a number of Khuzestani towns and villages forced Ahamdinejad to cancel his much-publicized visit to the province. (Later, he managed a shortened version of the trip amid tight security.)

In the past few weeks, the authorities have executed 11 men in connection with the nascent Arab revolt. Hundreds more have been arrested and shipped to jails in unknown destinations. Earlier this month, bands of Arab youths ran riot in the streets of Ahvaz, capital of the southwestern province of Khuzestan, attacking government offices and banks and setting official cars on fire. According to eyewitnesses, the authorities had to bring in special Baseej (Mobilization) militia units to regain control. The pro-government militia later raided a number of neighborhoods, including Khazaalyiah and Kut-Abdallah, where ethnic Arabs form a majority, arresting dozens of people. Among them was Thamer Ahvazi, regarded as one of the province’s top musical pop stars. His crime? Singing “defiant” rap-style songs in Arabic.

There are no accurate figures regarding the number of ethnic Arabs in Iran. The best estimates, however, put the number at around 2.2 million, or more than three percent of the total population. They are stretched over 600 kilometers of territory, from the borders of Iraq to the Straits of Hormuz on the Gulf of Oman. More than half, however, live in Khuzestan, Iran’s oil-rich province that also produces a good part of the nation’s food, including almost all of its sugarcane and 80 percent of its date crops.

Until the late 1940s, ethnic Arabs were in majority in Ahvaz, the provincial capital and Khorrmashahr, the nation’s biggest port until its destruction by Saddam Hussein in 1981.

Now, however, ethnic Arabs account for less than 25 percent of the population in Ahvaz, and just some 40 percent in Khorramshahr. Nevertheless, ethnic Arabs still form a majority in smaller towns along the border with Iraq, including Shadegan, Howeyzeh, Karkheh, and Dasht-Mishan. The population of the Iranian portion of the Mesopotamian marshlands is also almost entirely Arab.

The province’s mainly Arab feature changed for several reasons.

First, the discovery of oil in 1908 led to an economic boom that created new job opportunities that the locals could not fulfill. Hundreds of thousands of peoples from provinces in the Iranian heartland poured into Khuzestan, first as temporary laborers and then as permanent residents.

The second reason was a government policy, formulated in 1928, to “Persianize” Arab majority areas by bringing whole families of farmers from distant provinces, including Khorassan some 1000 miles away. The newcomers revived the province’s moribund agriculture, introduced new crops and, as they prospered, multiplied faster than native Arabs who remained largely excluded from the new economy.

The introduction of the military draft also helped the change. Many ethnic Arabs decided to smuggle their male children to the Arab coast of the Gulf to avoid obligatory military service. Most never returned.

Sometimes whole families and clans emigrated to avoid the draft and taxation by an increasingly assertive central government in Tehran. At the same time, the better-educated ethnic Arabs moved north to settle in Tehran, the capital, and other major cities in the Iranian heartland where they gradually lost their Arab identity.

It is hard to identify the exact causes of the current tension in Khuzestan. One source of tension is the emergence in neighboring Iraq of a new government dominated by Arab Shiites. In the Islamic republic, however, not a single ethnic Arab is in any key government position. Many Arab Shiites try to live on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border without having lost their ancient bonds of blood and tradition. The Bani Kaab, the Bani Amer, the Bani Tamim and other smaller tribes have always moved and intermarried regardless of the border fixed in 1921 when the British crated the new Iraqi state out of three Ottoman provinces.

The dream of a unified Arab Shiite state, encompassing central and southern Iraq as well as the Iranian province of Khuzestan, which Arab nationalists call “Arabistan”, appeals to many activists on both sides of the border. Not surprisingly, some local tribal chiefs and even Shiite mullahs are trying to use that dream to build a constituency for themselves.

Another source of the tension is the activities of a number of armed groups, some of which set up by Saddam Hussein in the 1970s as a means of exerting pressure on Tehran. These groups, often linked to armed smuggling networks operating in both Iran and Iraq, have been mainly responsible for attacks on border posts and police stations in a number of towns close to the border.

The main source of the tension, however, is the central government’s policy of implicit discrimination against the Arab minority. This is especially manifest in state-owned corporations where non-Arabs have an automatic advantage in terms of job opportunities, grades and pay.

Arabs are also at a disadvantage when it comes to places in higher education. Entry into Iranian universities is through a tough set of examinations known as “konkour”. Ethnic Arabs disadvantaged at the examination because they usually come from worst rated secondary schools, do not quite master the Persian, the language of the tests, and are unfamiliar with specific questions dealing with Persian culture and literature. As a result, an ethnic Arab’s chance of getting into an Iranian university is 12 times lower than his compatriots from Tehran, Shiraz or Isfahan. Demands that at least 10 percent of places at local universities be reserved for ethic Arabs have been turned down by successive Islamic republic administrations in Tehran. Ahmadinejad regards positive discrimination as “un-Islamic”.

One outlet for Arab-Iranian grievances is the so-called Khuzestan Welfare Party that calls for greater autonomy for the province within the Iranian state. Created in 1946, the party disappeared in the mid-1950s, to reappear in 2005. No one can gauge its strength. But it provides a moderate alternative to the radical Ahvaz Liberation Front (ALF) that has preached armed struggle since the 1970s.

The revolt of Arab-Iranians is in its early stages. There is, as yet, no evidence that it might degenerate into secessionism. Ahmadinejad’s repressive policies, however, could help those who claim that ethnic Arabs would be better off in a secular democratic state with their Iraqi Shiite Arab brethren than remaining within an Islamic republic dominated by chauvinistic mullahs.

The outside world should pay attention to what is happening in Khuzestan if only because it produces almost 70 percent of the oil that Iran exports each day.
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Voice of America: Iran's Fifth Column By Ali Ghaderi and Karim Abdian PJM LA August 15, 2007 Are American taxpayers unwittingly funding the Iranian regime’s own propaganda? Ali Ghaderi and Karim Abdian contend that US government-funded Voice of America Persia and Radio Farda are ultimately damaging to American interests. Not only do these broadcasting services have sympathy for the ruling theocracy, but their inherent Persian bias alienates Iranian ethnic and religious minorities.

Last month, Iran launched Press TV, an English-language television station to broadcast propaganda to the West, utilizing a network of loyal and well-paid correspondents across the world. But their task could have been made easier if they had simply translated broadcasts from the Voice of America Persian Service and Radio Farda, which are both funded by US taxpayers.

Millions of Congress-approved dollars are poured into the VOA-Persian Service and Radio Farda ostensibly to promote democracy and break the Iranian regime’s overbearing censorship. However, they are facing increased scrutiny following damning reports by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma, the General Accountability Office (GAO), and the government’s inter-agency Iran Steering Group. These reports condemned both VOA-Persian and Radio Farda for sympathy with sections of the Iranian regime and for often recycling the regime’s own propaganda. The situation is so bad that some Iranians in the US have begun to question whether the journalists employed by VOA-Persian and Radio Farda are agents for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence.

Some have also pointed to the inherent ethnic (Persian) chauvinism and cronyism in these broadcasts, which are alienating the non-Persian nationalities who are at least half, and by some estimates as high as two-thirds, of the total population in Iran. Activists representing a coalition of non-Persian parties campaigning for ethnic minority rights who monitor VOA Persian Service have released a study that shows that of the 132 people interviewed by VOA-Persian in May of 2007, just over two percent were from the ethnic minority groups of Kurds and Balochis. Thus, Ahwazi Arabs, Azeri-Turks, Turkmens, and others were completely excluded from these broadcasts despite the documented ongoing human rights violations against minorities by the Iranian regime.

These Farsi broadcasts (especially of VOA-Persian Service), claim Iranian minorities are controlled and managed by staunch supporters of the deposed Shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi II, and share the regime’s antipathy towards non-Persian ethnic groups. Reza Pahlavi and his senior advisors such as Shahriar Ahi and Draiush Homayoun are frequently—sometimes daily—featured on VOA-Persian TV.

The “guests” on these broadcasts are usually hand-picked Persian monarchists, ultra-nationalists or individuals with nationalist inclinations, who depict Iran as a Persian nation period, ignoring the claims of non-Persian Iranians who insist that Persians, despite their political dominance, are in a minority, and no more than a third of the total population. Most of the ultra-nationalists featured on VOA-Persian service believe and practice the ideology of Arian or Persian supremacy and don’t believe that one can be Iranian and non-Persian at the same time.

In addition to these paid and unpaid guests who are consultants and senior advisers to Reza Pahlavi, former cabinet ministers and former diplomats of the Shah are also frequently featured on VOA-Persian TV. One was interviewed 15 times, and the rest multiple times in the single month of May alone. Aside from one Kurd and one Baloch, no members of the remaining non-Persian minorities were heard. US-funded radio and TV stations are targeting Persian monarchists, who represent an extreme minority in Iran.

Be it imperial or republican, Iran is clearly an ethnically diverse society, and ethnic dynamics have always been present throughout its history. Non-Persian ethnic groups are a major part, and play a dominant role in the current socio-political struggle for democratic transformation. The VOA broadcast should reflect this diversity. Under an ideal situation US government sponsored broadcasts should dare to be a platform for oppressed minorities and not a propaganda tool for the regime that portrays Iran as a Persian nation with no minority discontent.

Incredibly, VOA and Radio Farda refuse to broadcast news of human rights violations against ethnic and linguistic minorities, according to Iranian minority rights activists. Yet, according to Amnesty International, “Minorities are subject to discriminatory laws and practices,” including restrictions on housing, the confiscation of land and property, denial of employment, and restrictions on cultural expression. This discrimination, AI adds, often results in “other human rights violations such as the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, grossly unfair trials of political prisoners before Revolutionary Courts, corporal punishment and use of the death penalty, as well as restrictions on movement and denial of other civil rights.” Amnesty International’s Iran desk has campaigned intensively for the release of prisoners of conscience campaigning for minority rights as well as an end to policies amounting to discrimination and persecution.

In November 2006, the European Parliament and the UN General Assembly also joined in the chorus of condemnation of the Iranian regime’s discriminatory practices. In a rare display of unanimity, all the political groups in the European Parliament—from Conservatives to Communists—backed a resolution that condemned “the current disrespect of minority rights and demands that minorities be allowed to exercise all rights granted by the Iranian Constitution and international law.” Further, the UN General Assembly voiced concern over “increasing discrimination and other human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities,” and called on Iran to eliminate ethnic discrimination.

But a listener to VOA-Persian or Radio Farada would not hear a word against the regime’s practices against minorities—especially against Arabs and Balochis&mdashwho have been subjected to ethnic cleansing, subject to population transfer, land confiscation and occasional aerial bombardment.

The State Department has oversight responsibility over VOA, but in this case they are clearly not exercising any influence to manage the overall message of the broadcasts. Undersecretary Karen Hughes, on behest of Secretary Rice, occupies a seat on the Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG), the main controlling body with oversight responsibility for all US Government non-military broadcasts. It is not clear if this body is aware that the overall message implied by VOA Persian language broadcast is that the US supports a strategy of re-establishing monarchy and favors keeping intact the rule of Persian minority dominance in Iran.

In a letter to VOA Director Dan Austin, representatives of Iranian Kurds, Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baloch, Lors and Turkmen argue that “on the rare occasions when someone from a minority group is invited to express an opinion on VOA-Persian TV, they have been subjected to an inquisition, on-and off-air, in which they are required to state their allegiance to the Iranian or Persian nation over their own ethnic group.” Those who dare to describe themselves as Kurdish, Arab, Baloch, or simply refer to themselves as even Arab-Iranian, Balochi-Iranian, Kurdish-Iranian, etc., are not welcomed or deprived of further appearances. The existence of this discriminatory vetting process in a US government sponsored broadcast service is incredibly disturbing. One can only assume that it was allowed to continue because neither the VOA director nor the BBG were aware of what was and is going on.

Representatives of Iranian ethnic and religious minorities living in the US claim that VOA is violating its charter by its practical discrimination against non-Persian groups and has called for the dismissal of the Persian Service Director and key managers who are responsible for executing the current editorial policy. According to these representatives, VOA-Persian Service management argue that only a restored monarchy in Iran, or the current Persian-dominated theocratic regime are necessary to ensure Iran’s territorial, cultural, and linguistic integrity.

Unless there is a radical shake-up in these US-funded TV and radio stations, they risk becoming a greater threat to US interests than Iran’s Press TV will ever be. The millions of dollars spent on VOA and Radio Farda could be better spent on the dozens of financially poor grassroots radio and television stations run by genuine Iranian opposition groups that enjoy high ratings in their target ethnic audiences and beyond.
--
Ali Ghaderi is U.S. Representative of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. Karim Abdian, Ph.D., Executive Director of the Ahwaz Human Rights Organization, is U.S. Representative of the Ahwazi-Arab Ethnic Minority in Iran.

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Power shifting in the Middle East

BY MOHAMAD BAZZI | mohamad.bazzi@newsday.com
August 26, 2007 ; http://www.newsday.com/

The Shia-led, non-Arab country has not only challenged the United States and its Arab allies throughout the Middle East, but it also has become the biggest beneficiary of U.S. involvement in Iraq, experts say.

By eliminating Saddam Hussein -- Iran's sworn enemy -- and installing a Shia-dominated government for the first time in Iraq's history, the United States strengthened Iran's clerical regime both in its battle with internal dissidents and in its struggle with Sunni Arab governments.

"Without lifting a finger, the Iranians became the most dominant regional power," said Diaa Rashwan, a senior researcher at Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies in Cairo.

An avowed enemy of Israel and the United States, which accuses Iran of trying to develop nuclear weapons, Tehran also has the Sunni-dominated Arab world on edge. Among the concerns: the regional ascendancy of Iran, its nuclear program, its growing influence on the Iraqi leadership and its involvement in other countries with large Shia communities, especially Lebanon.

And the direction of the war in Iraq has heightened the anxiety. "All regimes in the Middle East recognize that America has lost the war in Iraq," said Marwan Kabalan, a political science professor at Damascus University. "They're all maneuvering to protect their interests and to gain something out of the American defeat. ... Everyone is fighting battles through local proxies. It's like the Cold War."

The regional conflict is playing out on three fronts. In Iraq, neighboring Sunni regimes such as Saudi Arabia are backing Sunni militants, while Iran supports Shia militias. In Lebanon, Hezbollah -- a Shia militia backed by Iran and its less powerful ally, Syria -- has been trying for months to topple a government aligned with Washington and authoritarian Sunni Arab regimes. And in the Palestinian territories, Iran and Syria are supporting Hamas, while the United States and its Arab allies are backing beleaguered Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah movement.

"All of the region's crises are now interconnected, thanks to the war in Iraq," said Rashwan. "Nothing can be resolved without the Americans finding a way out of Iraq."

Today, just about anyone associated with the United States is viewed in the Arab world as a traitor, starting with the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. "Even though their leaders are allied with America, Arabs are more angry at America than ever before," said Mohammad Salah, Cairo bureau chief of Al-Hayat, a pan-Arab newspaper. "They don't want any more American meddling in the region. ... They don't trust any government that is supported by Washington."

The Bush administration has become so unpopular in the region that even some of its staunchest allies are trying to publicly distance themselves from it. No Arab regime is closer to Washington than Saudi Arabia, the second largest foreign oil provider to the United States. But at an Arab League summit in March, Saudi King Abdullah for the first time harshly criticized the U.S. military presence in Iraq, calling it an "illegitimate foreign occupation."

That statement was aimed at appeasing Arab masses angry about the growing bloodshed in Iraq and Arab regimes' continued alliance with Washington. Abdullah's comment resonated well in the Arab world, with analysts, newspaper columnists and average citizens praising the kingdom for challenging U.S. policies.

"Saudi Arabia's rulers view themselves as the rightful leaders of the Muslim world, but Iran is challenging that leadership right now," said Rashwan. "The Saudis must try to show that they can be independent from America."

Although Saudi Arabia has a Sunni majority, its rulers fear Iran's potential influence over a sizable and sometimes-restive Shia population concentrated in the kingdom's oil-rich Eastern Province. In neighboring Bahrain, another key American ally in the Persian Gulf, the Shia majority is chafing under Sunni rulers, who also fear Iran's reach.

The Saudis have tried to pursue their own agenda in the Middle East, apart from Washington's. In February, Abdullah brokered an agreement between Hamas and Fatah for a unity government in the Palestinian territories. By June, the deal collapsed and Hamas took control of Gaza by force, prompting Abbas to dissolve the unity government.

"The traditional powers in the Arab world are working behind the scenes to undermine Iran's influence," said Kabalan. "One way they can do that is by showing some progress on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, even if it's not real progress."

The Hamas takeover was a victory for Iran, which sent tens of millions of dollars to the militant group since it won Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006. "While the Americans and Europeans were trying to isolate Hamas by cutting off all funding to the Palestinians, Iran moved in to help Hamas," said Salah. "The West gave Iran this opportunity to increase its influence."

Arab leaders are not worried that Iran will export the cultural and theological aspects of Shiism; rather, analysts say, they're afraid of political Shiism spreading to the Arab world through groups like Hezbollah. The Shia militia's strong showing against a far superior Israeli military during last summer's war in Lebanon has electrified the Arab world, and Hezbollah's actions offer a stark contrast to Arab rulers cooperating with the United States.

"Iran has been successful in its support of Hezbollah and Hamas," said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, an expert on the Shia and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. "Arab regimes now fear that their Sunni populations will be seduced by Iran and Hezbollah's message of challenging the United States and empowering the dispossessed."

There is a historical precedent for this. The 1979 Islamic Revolution, a popular uprising led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini against the U.S.-backed shah, inspired revolutionary zeal among nationalists throughout the Arab world. The revolution's aftershocks were felt for a long time in the Middle East, helping, indirectly, to give rise to some militant Sunni movements and inspiring Shia communities in Lebanon and Iraq. Nowhere was that influence more deeply felt than in Lebanon, where Iran helped create Hezbollah after the Israeli invasion of 1982.

Fearful of this new challenge from Shias to become the torch-bearers of Arab nationalism, the Saudis are trying to reassert their role as leaders of the Arab and wider Muslim world. In his speech at the Arab summit, Abdullah insisted that only when Arab leaders unite will they "be able to prevent foreign powers from shaping the region's future" -- a reference to both the United States and Iran.

"The Middle East is at a historical juncture," said Rashwan. "It's not simply the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but events in Iraq and Iran that will have a profound impact on the future of the Arab world."