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Violence and Rebellion in Iranian
Balochistan
Volume 4, Issue 13 (June 29, 2006)
The Jamestown Foundation
By Chris Zambelis
The escalating insurgency
in Pakistan's southwestern province of Balochistan and neighboring regions
receives extensive media coverage. Aside from the need to root out radical
Islamist opposition movements tied to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistan
faces a series of domestic threats based on ethnic, sectarian and regional
rivalries and grievances. Internal tensions also stem from Pakistan's
failure to integrate disparate ethnic, religious and tribal communities in
its outlying regions into the fabric of a unified state structure that
transcends other allegiances (Terrorism Focus, March 21).
In contrast, evidence of a simmering rebellion and escalating violence
between Tehran's own ethnic Baloch minority and Iranian security forces in
Iran's vast but sparsely populated southeastern province of
Sistan-Balochistan is receiving far less attention. Iranian officials and
other observers implicate an obscure Baloch militant organization known as
Jundallah (Soldiers of God) for spearheading the uprising. The Baloch
campaign in Iranian Balochistan, sometimes referred to as West Balochistan
by Baloch nationalists, is also being waged online through a sophisticated
network of independent news, activist and nationalist websites and chat
forums hosted in the region and abroad in multiple languages. Many of
these websites openly support the activities of Jundallah and violence in
general against Tehran and others perceived to be oppressing Baloch in the
region [1].
Ideology and Identity
Iranian Baloch see
themselves as the heirs of an ancient and proud tradition distinct from
Iran's ethnic Persian population—that make up a slim majority in Iran—and
other groups that comprise the Islamic Republic. Iranian Baloch often
identify with the larger Baloch community that resides in Pakistan and
Afghanistan in what is referred to as "Greater Balochistan" because tribal
and family lines traverse all three countries. The Baloch historical
narrative is shaped by a collective sense of oppression and victimization
by the imperial machinations of regional and colonial powers that have led
to the division of the Baloch nation. One Baloch nationalist website
directed toward Western audiences compares the historic plight of the
Baloch to that of the Kurds and their longing for a Kurdish state
(http://www.baloch2000.org).
Unlike most Iranians who are Shiites, the overwhelming majority of Iran's
Baloch population adheres to the Sunni branch of Islam. Despite a lack of
concrete evidence, Iranian authorities and some analysts believe that
Jundallah may have ties to Sunni Islamist extremists associated with
al-Qaeda and the Taliban operating across the border in neighboring
Pakistan and Afghanistan. These allegations are likely based on
Jundallah's reliance on religious symbols and discourse in expressing its
nationalist aspirations and deep-seated resentment toward the
Shiite-dominated Iranian state. Baloch nationalist organizations also
emphasize the Sunni-Shiite element—real or perceived—in the nascent
conflict, further proof in Tehran's view of the group's Sunni extremist
pedigree. Jundallah is also reported to operate under different names that
reflect its purported Islamist bent, including Fedayeen-e-Islam (those who
sacrifice for Islam) (Asia Times, June 8).
At the same time, tribal allegiances and centers of authority built on
family lineage traditionally supersede strict religious adherence among
the semi-nomadic Baloch. Instead, Iranian Baloch practice a form of tribal
Islam. Many observers argue that Tehran is exaggerating the alleged role
of al-Qaeda in the Baloch insurgency in an effort to divert attention from
the problems affecting Sistan-Balochistan and to tarnish the Baloch cause.
It could also be a way for Tehran to curry favor with the United States
amidst pressure to concede on its nuclear ambitions and its meddling in
Iraq. Hardliners in Tehran downplay ethnic and sectarian tensions in Iran.
They instead blame foreign intelligence services with an interest in
destabilizing the country through the support of restive minorities (Asia
Times, June 8; al-Jazeera, October 17, 2005).
Although Pakistani Balochistan remains a stronghold of Taliban elements
and their local sympathizers, Baloch nationalists there rely far less on
Sunni Islamist discourse in framing their cause and instead emphasize
ethnic and tribal identity and economic grievances (Deccan Herald, August
12, 2004). Given its large Sunni majority, a Baloch nationalist campaign
framed in religious rhetoric would have less resonance in Pakistan. In
this sense, Baloch nationalists in Iran may be using Sunni discourse to
highlight their distinct place in Shiite-dominated Iran as an oppressed
and disadvantaged ethnic and religious minority (The Nation, December 23,
2005).
Jundallah Militancy
Little is known about Jundallah's origins. The group is led by Abdulmalak
Rigi, a 23 year-old Iranian Baloch
(http://www.roozonline.com). It is believed to have emerged on the
scene in 2003 and is known for bold attacks against high-profile targets,
especially government and security officials. In a May telephone interview
with Rooz, an Iranian online newspaper, Rigi defended Jundallah's use of
violence as a just means to defend Baloch and Sunni Muslim interests in
Iran and to draw attention to the plight of his people whom he describes
as Iran's poorest and the victims of genocide. Significantly, Rigi
declares himself an Iranian and Iran as his home. He also claims not to
harbor separatist aspirations. Instead, according to Rigi, Jundallah's
goal is to improve the life of Iranian Baloch
(http://www.roozonline.com).
In June 2005, Jundallah claimed responsibility for the abduction of a team
of Iranian security and intelligence officers traveling in a convoy in
Iranian Balochistan along the Pakistani border. In a videotaped ultimatum
released to al-Arabiya television, the group justified its attack as
revenge against Iranian security forces for committing alleged atrocities
in the region. The tape included a demand for the release of Jundallah
members and other Baloch activists detained in state prisons in exchange
for the safe release of the hostages. Jundallah released a second video
statement three weeks later showing the execution of Shehab Mansuri, whom
the group claimed was an Iranian intelligence officer (Iran Daily, January
21; al-Arabiya, June 2005).
Another operation in mid-March included the abduction and assassination of
several Iranian security officials, including members of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and aid officials affiliated with the
Islamic Red Crescent. A similar operation in May claimed another 12
victims. The group has also been implicated in several strikes against
infrastructure in Iranian Balochistan and outside of the province
(al-Jazeera, March 22).
Baloch nationalist websites frequently post graphic photographs and video
footage of alleged Iranian security operations and atrocities committed
against Iranian Baloch civilians
(http://www.balochwarna.org). The official website of the
Balochistan People's Party (BPP), a movement advocating the federalization
of Iran and what it describes as Baloch sovereignty within a democratic
Iran, describes a recent Iranian military operation that allegedly
commenced on May 15 as the "Islamic clerical regime's atrocities towards
Sunni Baloch" and included helicopter gunships and airstrikes against
civilian centers in Sistan-Balochistan. The website also includes visual
evidence of what it claims are innocent victims of Tehran's crackdown and
the recent killing of Sunni Baloch clerics by Iranian security forces
(http://www.balochpeople.org).
It is unclear whether a group operating under the name Jundallah in
Pakistani Balochistan is affiliated with its Iranian counterpart, although
Tehran and Islamabad claim that Baloch militants on both sides of the
border cooperate in the area of arms and narcotics trafficking and
financing (The News International, January 8; Asia Times, June 8). Given
the lawless and porous border region dividing Iranian and Pakistani
Balochistan, it is difficult to determine whether this cross-border
activity is linked to Jundallah's campaign or everyday crime typical in
the region.
Historically, Tehran and Islamabad have collaborated in suppressing Baloch
nationalism, often through brutal military crackdowns. Both countries see
Baloch nationalism as a serious threat to regional stability and the
territorial integrity of both states. Ongoing negotiations over the
construction of a proposed pipeline that would deliver Iranian natural gas
to Pakistan and India, much of which would traverse large swaths of
Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan, is another point of concern that brings
both sides together on the threat posed by Baloch nationalism and the
emergence of groups such as Jundallah (Dawn, June 10).
An Underserved Community
Accurate demographic data on Iran's ethnic Baloch minority does not exist,
largely for political reasons. In fact, the same holds for Iran's other
ethnic and religious minorities, especially the sizeable Azerbaijani,
Kurdish and Arab communities. Unofficial estimates of Iran's Baloch
population range between one million and upwards of four million. The
overwhelming majority of Baloch reside in Pakistan, while the rest inhabit
parts of Afghanistan, totaling between 10 and 15 million.
Iranian Balochistan represents one of Iran's most impoverished and
underserved regions. This is partially due to the region's inhospitable
and arid climate. Sistan-Balochistan is also considered a lawless
territory where the central government holds little sway. Years of
systematic neglect and mismanagement by Tehran are also to blame for the
social and economic despair and backwardness that characterize the region.
Baloch in Iran suffer from high illiteracy and an overall lack of public
services compared to the rest of the country. They are also marginalized
politically by Tehran. A Baloch website reportedly run by the BLA claims
that Tehran and its neighbors maintain a longstanding policy of
suppressing Baloch culture and identity. This includes schemes designed to
deliberately impoverish the region in order to ensure the inferior status
of ethnic Baloch in Iran and elsewhere in the geographic area
(http://www.balochvoice.com).
Conclusion
Tehran's resort to force in quelling the uprising in Sistan-Balochistan
through deployments of special and regular army units is not likely to
contribute to lasting peace and stability in the region. Since Iranian
Baloch grievances run deep, movements such as Jundallah will maintain a
sizeable following among the population. Although there is no credible
evidence implicating the group of al-Qaeda's brand of radicalism or the
strain of Taliban-style Sunni extremism violently opposed to Shiite Islam
found in parts of Pakistan, Jundallah's cause does have the potential to
be hijacked by militants with a different agenda. This has serious
implications for stability, not only in Iran's Sistan-Balochistan
province, but Pakistani Balochistan as well. At the same time, despite its
Sunni Islamist rhetoric, Jundallah's agenda to date remains fixated on
Iranian Baloch causes.
Notes
1. For a list of links to a diverse
array of Baloch news, activist and nationalist websites that purport to
feature detailed accounts of fighting in Iranian Balochistan and Pakistani
Balochistan, including graphic photographs and video of alleged victims
and military operations, visit the homepage of the Stockholm-based Radio
Balochistan, http://www.radiobalochi.org. The
Baloch nationalist website hosted by the self-proclaimed "Government of
Balochistan in Exile" also contains useful information from a Baloch
nationalist perspective,
http://governmentofbalochistan.blogspot.com.
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