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The Proxy War
July 15, 2006
Asharq Alawsat; http://www.asharq-e.com/
Amir Taheri
Until even a week ago the conventional wisdom was that there is not going
to be another major war in the Middle East involving Israel. Now even the
most optimistic observers are no longer sure. Meeting in Saint Petersburg
this weekend, the leaders of the G-8 may try to stop a broader war, almost
at the last minute. But, can they?
The reasons why a broader war may be in the cards are not hard to fathom.
Israel, facing what is a pincer operation by both Hamas in the occupied
territories and the Hezbollah in Lebanon believes it is facing an
existential threat.
This does not mean that either Hamas or Hezbollah, or their combination,
would be in a position to defeat Israel militarily. However, both are
capable of pursuing a low intensity war against Israel virtually forever.
And that, like all low intensity wars, would aim at breaking the spirit of
the enemy, persuading more and more Israelis that their homeland is not a
place in which to have a normal life and raise children, and that their
best bet is to head for safe havens elsewhere. Low intensity war is also
bad for any nation's economy. People cannot think of long-term investments
when the see missile raining on them. The effects of low intensity war on
Israel are even more strongly felt because of the country's demographic
disadvantage. Living under the threat of suicide attacks is hardly an
encouragement for making babies.
At the opposite side of the fight, Hamas and Hezbollah are also facing
existential threats, as they know that Israel is determined to destroy
them as political organisations.
Israel has refused to recognise the Hamas-led government and has succeeded
in organising what amounts to an international quarantine against it. If
Hamas ends up by tearing up its own charter and recognising the legitimacy
of Israel's existence, it would spell its own doom as a radical Islamist
movement. If, on the other hand, it persists with its no compromise stance
it will be seen by many Palestinians as responsible for all the hardship
they now suffer. Hamas in government is quite different from Hamas as an
independent movement.
As for Hezbollah almost all of its prestige, or whatever is left of it, is
based on the myth that it defeated the Israelis and drove them out of
occupied southern Lebanon. At the same time Hezbollah is the target of
United Nations resolution 1559 that demands its dissolution as an armed
group. Hezbollah without arms would become just another Lebanese political
party, garnering around 20 per cent of the votes.
The Hezbollah faces another, perhaps bigger, problem: it must develop its
policies within a broader strategy worked out by the Islamic Republic in
Tehran and the Baa'thist government in Damascus. As a result, it cannot
simply decide to defuse the situation in the hope of keeping its military
organisation intact. Iran, coming under growing pressure on the nuclear
issue, is desperately looking for a diversion. And what better diversion
than a mini-war that could keep international attention focused on the
Israel-Lebanon-Palestine triangle? Syria, for its part, could profit from
a limited war, between Israel and Hezbollah, by pointing out that its own
presence in Lebanon had been a stabilising force and that efforts to
exclude it from the Lebanese scene have generated greater instability.
In a sense, therefore, what we are witnessing is the opening shots in a
proxy war between the Islamic Republic and Syria on one side and Israel on
the other. As for Lebanon, it is, as so many other times in the past,
being used by rival regional and international powers as a battlefield in
which the Lebanese people are regarded as collateral damage at best.
Everyone knows that the Lebanese government does not have the power to
implement Resolution 1559 and disarm the Hezbollah. Everyone also knows
that Lebanon is not yet strong enough to ward off pressure and
intervention from outside powers, this time Syria and the Islamic
Republic.
The big question is this: will the Islamic Republic and Syria allow Israel
to destroy Hezbollah's war machine and disarm its militia?
If Tehran and Damascus sit back and watch while Israel dismantles their
principal asset in Lebanon, would they not lose all credibility as
sponsors of radical movements in the Middle East and beyond? Would
President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad who has vowed to wipe Israel off the map
start his presidency by sitting back and watch Israel wipe Hezbollah's
militia off the Lebanese chessboard? And what would the Assad regime look
like if it did nothing to prevent Hezbollah, the bastion of Syrian
influence in Lebanon, being broken in the current round of fighting? To be
sure, Syria still has some Maronite allies in Lebanon. But these allies
are there because Hezbollah is there. Once Hezbollah is out of the
equation as an armed group, watch for Michel Aoun and others running in
all directions in search of new protectors.
The Irano-Syrian strategy, especially since Ahmadinejad's decision to make
the destruction of the Jewish state a priority of his administration,
would encourage those in Israel who insist that it should seize the
current opportunity for breaking the Hezbollah's war machine even in the
face of a broader war. In doing so Israel could claim that it was simply
helping Lebanon implement Resolution 1559.
The stakes have been raised beyond anyone's expectation.
If Israel backs down now and ends its campaign without disarming the
Hezbollah it would, in effect, hand Iran and Syria an unexpected victory.
This would also spell the end of Lebanon's new democratic government and
the return in force of Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon. At the
other end of the spectrum in Palestine, such an Israeli retreat would give
a badly hurt Hamas a second lease of life and greater vigour to pursue its
radical strategy. If, on the other hand, Israel removes the Hezbollah from
the Lebanese scene it would be the turn of the leaderships in Tehran and
Damascus to come to terms with a major strategic setback that could
encourage their internal enemies. What is certain is that this conflict
will not end until one side wins and another side loses. The G-8 may try
to postpone decision-time for a bit longer. But it is hard not to see that
there are two visions of the Middle East, one backed by the United States
and its allies, including Israel, the other promoted by Iran and Syria and
their surrogates.
Since a synthesis of the two is not possible, even the G-8 may realise
that they cannot prevent a broader regional war.
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