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05-08-2006
Balochistan Still Simmering
Alok Bansal
Security Analyst, New Delhi
The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)
The insurgency in Balochistan is far from over. Apart from a series of
bomb blasts and attacks on gas pipelines, the Balochistan Liberation Army
(BLA) claims that it shot down a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fighter aircraft
on 10 September. During the past three months, symbols of government
authority have been targets; rockets have been fired at the chief
minister's residence, the electricity pylons, the railway lines, etc. The
Baloch nationalists have also claimed that the government is planning
another major military operation in the province. It appears that the
relative calm that has prevailed since the last bout of confrontation in
Dera Bugti is only the lull before the storm.
Last year saw Baloch nationalists planting mines, firing rockets,
exploding bombs and even ambushing military convoys, killing over 100
troops. The Sui airport building was blown up, gas pipelines and
electricity grids were repeatedly hit, the chief minister and the governor
were targeted. Their complaints related to gas royalties, setting up of
cantonments, and development projects, which deprive locals of the
benefits while allowing carpetbaggers to make a large profit. The
operations in Wana, and operations against Al Qaeda in Pakistan, however,
eclipsed the happenings in Balochistan throughout 2004. This year began
with a bang, acts of violence in Sui in January and Dera Bugti in March
forced the Pakistani establishment to sit up and take notice of
Balochistan. The BLA, an unknown organization hitherto, claimed
responsibility for most of these acts of violence.
The Balochis have rebelled four times since Pakistan's creation, demanding
greater autonomy, or even an independent state, which would reunite the
five million Balochis in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan under one flag.
Balochistan comprises 43 per cent of Pakistan's area but has only five
percent of Pakistan's population. It also has immense natural resources
and most of Pakistan's energy resources. Baloch joined Pakistan quite
reluctantly. The predominant ruler of Baloch - the Khan of Kalat signed
the merger document under duress, resulting in the first armed insurgency
in 1948. Since then, the Balochis have revolted thrice and have faced the
security forces in 1958, 1963 to 1969, and 1973 to 1977. Though the
insurgencies in the past have been crushed with a heavy hand, they have
left scars that are yet to heal. Each insurgency has been more intense
than the previous one, and the organisational capabilities and the popular
support for the insurgents have increased with each subsequent insurgency.
At the height of insurgency in 1973, 55,000 insurgents faced 80,000
Pakistani troops. The Pakistan Air Force as well as The Iranian Air Force
supported these troops. More than 5,000 insurgents and over 3,300 soldiers
were killed in the insurgency that lingered on until 1977.
The current spate of violence has manifested after a hiatus of three
decades and at a time when most of the nationalists are out of power in
Quetta. The insurgents have mainly attacked developmental activities and
economic targets. Gas pipelines, railway tracks, bridges, power
transmission lines, telephone exchanges, military and government
installations have been targeted with amazing regularity. The rape of a
woman doctor in Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) complex at Sui in
January, allegedly by an Army Captain, saw pitched battles between
insurgents and security forces. In four days of fighting 14,000 rounds of
small arms, the insurgents fired 436 mortar shells and 60 rockets. In
another incident at Dera Bugti, a minor exchange of fire between the
tribesmen and the security personnel resulted in both sides firing rockets
and shelling mortars. The daylong shelling claimed 67 lives, including 33
Hindus and eight troops. Over 100 people were injured and houses and
temples were severely damaged.
A parliamentary committee set up to address problems of Balochistan has
recommended a hefty economic package, but the nationalists have rejected
its report. The Pakistani establishment has rather simplistically
attributed the violence in Balochistan to mainly two factors, the
rejection of nationalist parties by the voters in the last elections and
the apprehension of feudal lords that the mega developmental projects will
expose the population to outside world and weaken their hold. However, a
careful analysis indicates a deep-rooted alienation in Baloch, whose
people feel they have been denied representation in the government and
perceive it as an alien government. There are hardly any Balochis in the
Army or top federal jobs, even most of the provincial jobs are held by
outsiders. As a result, the ratio of unemployment in Balochistan is
highest in the country.
The Balochis fear marginalisation in their own province by Pakhtoons and
other Pakistanis. This feeling of being reduced to a minority has led them
to oppose the mega projects, as they perceive that it will not result in
greater economic opportunities for them but will be used by outsiders to
colonise their land. Absence of genuine federalism and the lack of any
worthwhile decision making powers with the provincial government under the
current military dispensation has accentuated the alienation of
population. The issue has to be dealt with prudently to prevent the spiral
of violence that threatens Pakistan's existence.
http://www.ipcs.org/kashmirLevel3.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1842&subCatID=null&mod=null
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05-08-2006
The Other Militants:
Lingering Baluchi Nationalism
Todd Armstrong
Research Intern, IPCS
Following the bombings in London and Egypt, Islamabad faces increased
international pressure to address militant activities within Pakistan.
While government officials have confirmed reports that the July 7 bombing
suspects spent time in Pakistan, there are fresh accusations of Pakistani
links to the Sharm el-Sheikh attacks. In response, President Musharraf has
launched a crackdown on militant groups in Pakistan, which includes
proceeding against funding mechanisms, "hate speech," and undertaking
madrassa reforms - many of these actions were expected after his
"ground-breaking" renunciation of terrorism in 2002.
The 9/11 attacks ushered a new era in US-Pakistani cooperation, but US
pressure on Islamabad to abandon its support of militants, including those
in Kashmir, has been decidedly muted. Notwithstanding Indian protests, US
policy-makers publicly appreciate Pakistan's role in the war on terrorism,
while privately advising Islamabad to balance US cooperation to erode the
growing influence of Islamic political parties.
Some analysts have distinguished between Pakistani counter-terrorism
efforts against non-Pakistani groups, Pakistani militants fighting in
Afghanistan, and Pakistani-supported militants in Kashmir. They argue that
Pakistani national interests have allowed significant success against the
first group-engendering engagement with the United States, but limited
success regarding the second, as a Karzai government collapse would be
welcomed by many in Pakistan. Given the Kashmir-centric focus of
traditional Pakistani policy, efforts to control the third set of
anti-Indian groups in Kashmir, have remained symbolic.
While the impact of international pressure on Islamabad to address its
"home-grown" militant groups is hotly debated, Islamabad's approach to a
different set of militants will be revealing. Since Partition, Islamabad
has faced a Baluchi nationalist movement in Baluchistan. Initially a
mountain-based guerrilla war, conflict between Baluchi forces and the
Pakistan Army reached its apex in the 1970s, when full-scale warfare
resulted in thousands of casualties, mostly in the civilian population.
Despite an abundance of natural resources, Baluchistan is the poorest and
least developed province of Pakistan. Though defeated in the 1970s, a
resilient Baluchi nationalist movement lingers on, garnering recruits and
support from a population disaffected with establishment policies that
emphasize resource transfer, but offer little in terms of investment,
autonomy, or resource sharing.
In January, a series of rocket attacks left dozens dead in the Sui gas
fields, prompting Islamabad to dispatch more troops and establish a new
military base in the region. Nevertheless, attacks have continued,
claiming over 100 lives this year. Apart from clashes between tribesmen
and troops, the insurgents have blockaded major roads and destroyed a
number of rail lines, power supply towers, and pipelines. At the end of
June, militants had fired rockets at the Quetta home of the provincial
Chief Minister.
In the past, such developments would be disturbing, but unremarkable,
chapters in the long-standing dispute. However, two major economic
projects underline Islamabad's need to maintain stability in the province.
The $1.16 billion deep-sea port at Gwadar is expected to become a regional
commercial hub, and a major source of revenue, given its location near the
Straits of Hormuz, through which 40 per cent of the world's oil passes.
With the first phase of construction completed, Islamabad hopes to secure
the benefits of increased trade with the Gulf States, Central Asia, South
Asia, and China.
Similarly, the proposed $4 billion pipeline would transport natural gas
from southern Iran, across Pakistan, into western India. This arrangement
will provide revenues to Iran, gas and transit fees to Pakistan, and
much-needed energy to the growing Indian economy. Notwithstanding US
pressure to abandon this project to isolate Iran, policy-makers in Tehran,
New Delhi, and Islamabad appear determined to proceed.
Facing a small but determined number of militants, Islamabad has attempted
to defuse the Baluchi insurgency by announcing plans to alter - or
consider altering - polices related to royalties, jobs, and even
centre-state relations. However, the Baluchi leaders have heard such
promises before, particularly from the Zia regime, with little follow
through. For a community fearful of further marginalization, increased
infrastructure investment simply translates to better roads for the army.
Gwadar Port offers little satisfaction, as very few locals have been
included in the construction and the port revenues remain unavailable to
the provincial government.
As policy makers in Colombia and Iraq have discovered, pipelines are
exceptionally vulnerable to attack. While easier to defend, Gwadar Port
could become a continuing symbol of Punjabi "colonization." Rather than
undertaking a major crackdown, stability in Baluchistan requires an
equitable approach to governance being pursued, which is yet to be
demonstrated by Islamabad. For analysts considering the interplay of
domestic and international pressure on the Musharraf regime, and the
prospects for democracy in Pakistan, Baluchistan provides a meaningful
litmus test.
http://www.ipcs.org/kashmirLevel3.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1805&subCatID=null&mod=null
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